Global Humanitarian Overview 2025

Attacks and access barriers are imperiling the lives of people in need of assistance

At a time when their work is more vital than ever, humanitarians and the services they provide are facing increasing attack, imperiling the lives of people in need of assistance. From the killing and detention of aid workers (particularly national staff) to attacks on health facilities and schools, to access barriers caused by legal and administrative measures, the ability of humanitarians to reach those in need—and for people in need to access critical assistance—is under unprecedented threat.

Humanitarians and the services they provide are under attack

Attacks against aid workers, as well as repeated harm against healthcare and educational facilities, are leaving many people in need without access to assistance and protection. 2024 has been the most dangerous year for aid workers, with 281 humanitarians killed—around 63 per cent in Gaza, OPT—and 525 subjected to major attacks. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) alone reported 226 of its staff killed in a single year of conflict between October 2023 and October 2024.

Aid in Action

Humanitarian access in the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Gaza, Occupied Palestinian Territory
OCHA

In September 2024, 83 per cent of all humanitarian movements to northern Gaza were either denied or impeded. Humanitarian access is critical to ensure that people with urgent needs receive critical aid.

Local aid workers—serving their own communities on the frontlines of conflict—are most exposed to violence. Between 2000 and 2023, 86 per cent of all aid worker victims were national staff from both international and national organizations, while 96 per cent of those killed, injured or kidnapped between January and October 2024 were national or local staff. Palestinian staff in OPT face particular danger: from January to October 2024, 176 Palestinian aid workers had been killed or injured, comprising 42 per cent of the global number of national/local staff who suffered an attack. In Sudan, more than 50 Emergency Response Room volunteers have reportedly been killed since the war began in April 2023. Since January 2024, at least 30 local Red Cross and Red Crescent staff and volunteers have been killed while on duty wearing the organization’s insignia, including 17 in OPT and 8 in Sudan.

Attacks on medical personnel and facilities continued in 2024, with new trends emerging that reflect blatant disregard for international humanitarian law. Between January and October 2024, 2,135 conflict-related attacks on health facilities were reported worldwide, leaving 605 of them damaged and 488 health workers dead. Figures this year may well surpass 2023, when over 700 medical workers were killed and thousands more injured, abducted, or arrested in conflict zones like OPT, Sudan and Ukraine. Concerning new trends have emerged in 2024, including ‘double-tap’ attacks, such as in Ukraine, where first responders and health transport personnel are three times more likely to be harmed in attacks compared to other health-care workers, according to the World Health Organization (WHO). In OPT, there were 1,196 attacks against health care, killing 846 people between 7 October 2023 and 19 September 2024. Every hospital in Gaza was affected, and WHO reports rising attacks against health workers and health facilities in Lebanon. Attacks on health infrastructure are also an example of how conflict can aggravate disease outbreaks: conflicts comprise national and local capacities to maintain the delivery of essential health services and the implementation of critical public health for disease prevention and control. In 2024, there were outbreaks of cholera, measles and malaria across the world—often concurrent—with the heaviest impact on people living through humanitarian emergencies.

Ukraine

Kyiv, Ukraine

Ukraine's largest children's hospital, Okhmatdyt, was struck on 8 July during one of the most extensive missile attacks on the country.

OCHA/Viktoriia Andriievska

Meanwhile, attacks on education are frequent and widespread, with devastating consequences for children and teachers, from Colombia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to OPT and Ukraine, according to the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack. Military use of schools and attacks on education rose nearly 20 per cent in 2022 and 2023 compared to the previous two years, averaging eight daily incidents. In 2023, there were about 6,000 attacks on students, educators, schools and universities, as well as the use of educational facilities for military purposes. In 2024, attacks have continued, as highlighted by the deaths of four school children and two teachers as the result of an air strike on two schools in Kayah state, eastern Myanmar, in February. And attacks are not limited to physical violence—in Afghanistan, June 2024 marked the grim milestone of 1,000 days since the announcement banning girls from attending secondary school.

Afghanistan

Afghanistan

A 16-year-old Afghan girl studies English at home. She has been out of school for three years, since the ban on girls' education forced her to leave in seventh grade.

UNICEF/Amin Meerzad

One of the most significant trends impacting the safety and security of aid workers is the increase in major armed conflicts involving national militaries, such as those in OPT, Sudan and Ukraine. In 2023, 57 per cent of aid worker fatalities occurred as a result of aerial bombardment, a means of violence almost exclusively used by State actors, according to Humanitarian Outcomes.

Arrests and detentions of aid workers, though less well-documented, are a rapidly growing concern. In 2024, the Houthi de facto authorities in Yemen detained more than 50 members of UN entities, international and national NGOs, civil society and other organizations supporting humanitarian activities. The detentions directly impeded humanitarian partners’ ability to reach the most vulnerable people in Yemen, including the 18.2 million people in need of humanitarian aid and protection.

While humanitarians are facing growing physical threats, they are also encountering increasingly complex challenges from misinformation, disinformation and hate speech (MDH), especially within conflict settings, according to Grand Challenges Canada.

Aid in Action

Reaching people who live under the control of armed groups

Mali
Mali
Example of a past sensitization session, conducted by the International Committee of the Red Cross, on international humanitarian law for combatants of the Arab Movement for Azawad (MAA) and the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA)
ICRC/S.N.

The landscape of armed groups can evolve rapidly, with new conflicts erupting and groups swiftly shifting control over territories. To track these changes, the International Committee of the Red Cross conducts an annual internal survey of armed groups of humanitarian concern, identifying trends and opportunities for improved engagement.

The 2024 survey found that 210 million people are living in areas controlled by armed groups, with 127 million in contested zones and 83 million in areas fully controlled by armed groups. People living in the 31 countries included in the GHO 2025 account for 90 per cent of this total: 190 million people are living in areas controlled by armed groups, with 110 million in contested zones and 80 million in areas fully controlled by armed groups. This is an increase of 16 million in fully controlled areas since 2023. Out of 455 armed groups worldwide (of which more than 130 are classified as non-State armed groups), 313 operate in GHO 2025 countries.

Africa accounts for nearly half of the global population residing in such areas, with 102 million people living in areas controlled by armed groups. Africa also accounts for the largest share in the number of armed groups, with 44 per cent of the global total (195).

The 2024 trend shows growth in both the number of persons living under the full control of armed groups and the share of armed groups that fully control territory. Compared to 2023, 19 million more people (a 9 per cent increase) now live in areas under the full control of armed groups. This is primarily explained by territorial expansions of armed groups in conflicts in Africa and Asia.

Individuals residing within territories controlled by armed groups face complex vulnerabilities and specific risks. These risks encompass their proximity to hostilities, which heightens the likelihood of civilian casualties or injuries; limited or non-existent access to essential infrastructure and services; the threat of blockades, sieges or sanctions that further diminish the availability of life-saving necessities and services; and the absence of government authorities, making it challenging for civilians to obtain essential legal documentation.

The growing number of armed groups has drastically heightened the operational challenges for humanitarian organizations trying to reach populations in their control. Access, dialogue, and engagement on issues like detainee protection, the restoration of family contacts and adherence to international law are crucial to understanding and meeting these populations' humanitarian needs.

Despite progress, administrative and legislative measures continue to hamper humanitarian operations

In December 2022, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted the landmark Resolution 2664 establishing a default ‘humanitarian exemption’ across all current and future UN sanctions regimes. UNSC Resolution 2664 set a new standard in protecting principled humanitarian action from the unintended consequences of UN asset freeze measures. Several Member States, especially donor countries, have incorporated UNSC Resolution 2664 into their national laws enforcing UN sanctions. In addition, most jurisdictions implementing unilateral sanctions have gone beyond their obligations under the resolution by voluntarily extending humanitarian exemptions to their unilateral asset freeze measures.

However, from Afghanistan and OPT, to Yemen, Syria and the Sahel, counterterrorism and sanctions-related measures (CT/S) continue to hinder humanitarian operations. Where humanitarian exemptions are not in place, all actors involved in humanitarian action—donors, aid organizations, banks and suppliers—are exposed to the risk of violating asset freeze measures and a range of CT and anti-money laundering laws and regulations when transferring resources necessary for routine operations.

This result is an inhibiting effect that can have negative consequences for humanitarian responses. In some cases, banks have refused to transfer funds or imposed long delays and cumbersome information requests. Some donors have declined to fund certain humanitarian activities in areas where sanctioned actors are active, restricted the type of aid grantees can provide, refused to directly fund local organizations or imposed burdensome reporting and due diligence requirements. Host Governments have also used CT/S to justify intimidating humanitarian staff, suspending NGO operations, designating no-go areas, blocking aid convoys, or prohibiting engagement with certain armed groups. Anticipating such restrictions, humanitarian organizations have in some instances self-censored when designing or implementing programmes.

These, however, are not the only measures restricting humanitarians. Bureaucratic and Administrative Impediments (BAI) are practices and policies which limit the ability of humanitarian organizations to reach people in need in a timely and unfettered manner. BAI have long been part of the Access Monitoring and Reporting Framework, and in recent years the humanitarian community has strengthened its ability to identify and address these impediments.

CT/S and other restrictive measures can sometimes challenge humanitarian organizations’ ability to provide efficient and impartial assistance, for the following reasons:

  • Some restrictive measures–including export and sectoral restrictions, anti-terrorism financing laws, anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism regulations, as well as administrative decisions and regulations by host Governments–lack standing humanitarian exemptions and hinder humanitarian operations.
  • CT/S and other restrictive measures still demand important due diligence, leading to compliance costs and delays. Profit and reputational concerns affect private sector decisions. Consequently, some banks and companies continue to refuse business in high-risk contexts.
  • Humanitarian exemptions are yet to translate into whole-of-Government policies of increased risk tolerance for principled humanitarian assistance. For example, in several jurisdictions, financial regulation agencies have not amended their internal policies and regulations to reflect humanitarian exemptions. Donors also continue to impose restrictions on some activities and programmes that are covered under applicable exemptions.

The Security Council, Governments and regional organizations should build on the significant progress made towards broadly implementing humanitarian exemptions and extend such exemptions to other restrictive measures, such as counterterrorism legislations or sectoral and export restrictions. They should continue to promote consistent, whole-of-Government standards, policies and practices that support risk tolerance for impartial humanitarian action.

BAI reporting to date has, however, predominantly focused on the impact of BAI on humanitarian agencies—through tracking indicators such as number of visas denied or number of project agreements delayed—rather than on the consequences of BAI for people’s access to services and assistance, according to according to the International Council for Voluntary Agencies.

Overall, humanitarians cannot address crises alone: diplomatic and political solutions are necessary to address the root causes of conflict. In 2018, diplomatic and political actors came together to unanimously adopt UN Security Council Resolution 2417, which directly links hunger with conflict, in an effort to protect food systems and humanitarian access. The resolution condemns starvation as a weapon of war and the unlawful denial of humanitarian aid to civilians. The resolution calls for adherence to IHL, urging parties to conflict to protect civilians, safeguard essential resources, ensure unimpeded humanitarian access and protect infrastructure critical to food systems and aid delivery. Resolutions, however, are not enough without the practical actions to safeguard humanitarian routes and without parties to a conflict meeting their obligations under IHL.

Aid in Action

Humanitarian notification system

Syrian Arab Republic
Aleppo, Syrian Arab Republic
Children run alongside a UN vehicle during an inter-agency advocacy mission in January 2024, led by the Deputy Regional Humanitarian Coordinator for the Syria Crisis. The mission visited the towns of Jandairis and A’zaz in north-west Syria, in commemoration of the one-year mark of the devastating earthquakes that hit Türkiye and Syria on 6 February 2023.
OCHA/Ali Haj Suleiman

While international law requires the protection of humanitarian personnel and assets and facilitation of their movement during conflict, the alarming rise in humanitarian deaths this year highlights the severe access and security challenges faced by aid workers. Recent hostilities in Lebanon have underscored these risks, putting hundreds of humanitarian actors and operations in jeopardy. In response, Lebanon became the tenth country where OCHA has launched a humanitarian notification system (HNS), in September 2024. The HNS allows humanitarian organizations to notify parties to the conflict about the locations of humanitarian sites and movements, enabling these to be factored into military planning. It is one humanitarian tool among several that support access and security.

The HNS aims to improve the likelihood of militaries or non-Sate groups facilitating access, and ensuring the security of humanitarian workers, assets and operations. In Yemen, the system enabled safe medical evacuations and urgent deep field missions. In Ukraine, it supported the evacuation of civilians from Mariupol. In Syria, it facilitated cross-line access, allowing humanitarian actors traverse frontlines and operate in areas controlled by various parties. This was achieved through a Member State leveraging its contacts and influence with non-State groups to respect humanitarian aid movements.

Use of a HNS is strictly voluntary for both humanitarian organizations and parties to the conflict. While it is one tool to support access, security and protection, a HNS is not an accountability mechanism; it and is not designed to guarantee access, security or protection and does not change the parties’ obligations under international law.

References

  1. Aid Worker Security Database, data accessed 25 November 2024.The likelihood of a national aid worker to be a victim of an attack was calculated by looking at the distribution of attacks of international vs national staff between 2000-2023 and calculating the average over that timeframe.
  2. In the ICRC’s usage, the generic term ‘armed group’ denotes a group that is not a State but has the capacity to cause violence that is of humanitarian concern. This includes those groups that are classified as non-State armed groups, as they qualify as parties to a non-international armed conflict.
  3. Countries with a country-specific plan (Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan, Flash Appeal or equivalent) at the time of GHO 2025 launch.
  4. Sectoral measures can mean restrictions placed on the financial, economic or other trade/industry sector.
  5. Ethiopia, Lebanon, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Occupied Palestinian Territory, South Sudan, Syria, Ukraine and Yemen.