Global Humanitarian Overview 2026

Under fire and under pressure: what happens when humanitarian action is hindered

Humanitarian action is under fire and under pressure as funding dissipates and attacks rise. Brutal funding constraints have stretched the lifelines that humanitarians provide to the limit in 2025. Many have already snapped, leaving millions of people without assistance and protection. At the same time, humanitarians, especially those serving their own communities, have been attacked trying to deliver assistance and protection to people in need.

Devastating funding cuts have left millions of people without aid

In 2025, humanitarian funding saw its greatest contraction in a decade, with donor cuts causing funding to drop below 2016 levels. The United States of America—traditionally, the largest humanitarian donor—funded $2.5 billion against the 2025 Global Humanitarian Overview (21 per cent of total GHO funding), compared to $11 billion in 2024 (which was 45 per cent of the total). This came on top of reductions from other donors, including France, Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, and on the back of a reduction in humanitarian aid from 2023 to 2024.

Confronted with this reality, in mid-2025, humanitarians took excruciatingly difficult decisions to hyper-prioritize response for people facing the most life-threatening needs. This hyper-prioritization led humanitarians to collectively focus their efforts on reaching 114.4 million people out of the 178.7 million total people targeted for 2025, and to urgently appeal for $29.1 billion out of the full $44 billion required.

The dramatic reduction in funding forced humanitarian organizations to severely reduce delivery to people in crisis—shutting down programmes, closing offices and laying off thousands of staff—with devastating consequences. In Colombia, 13 per cent of partners were forced to suspend or scale down humanitarian operations. In Mali, at least 45 per cent of life-saving programmes implemented by local NGOs were disrupted.

Globally, these funding shortfalls have meant that:

  • Millions of crisis-affected people around the world did not receive the help they needed. While some form of humanitarian assistance reached nearly 98 million people in 2025, this represented just 65 per cent of people targeted through country-specific plans. This is a stark reduction from 2024, when 123 million people—25 million more than in 2025—received at least one form of assistance. The contraction of humanitarian action was particularly evident in 21 countries which received less funding and reached fewer people. In countries like Cameroon, Chad, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Venezuela and Yemen, millions of people in each country did not receive planned assistance.
  • When people did receive humanitarian assistance and protection, it was often significantly reduced. In the Central African Republic, more than 50 per cent of people who received assistance only received one-third of the expected aid. In Somalia, food security partners reduced transfer values, the duration of assistance and had to cut people assisted by 70 per cent. Meanwhile, Sudanese refugees arriving in Uganda only received 60 per cent of the standard food ration (worth $8). In Egypt, a monthly cash assistance programme for refugees was reduced both in terms of the number of people reached as well as the transfer value, which decreased by 11 per cent. In Venezuela, people reached with aid saw their food rations cut in half and often given at a lower frequency.

  • Cuts in food assistance and emergency agriculture are jeopardizing lives. While acute hunger rose in 2025, humanitarian funding for food assistance, nutrition, and emergency agriculture plummeted, with a 51 per cent projected drop between 2022 and 2025. This would return funding to levels last seen in 2016–2017, despite the prevalence of acute hunger doubling since then. The impact is severe. Humanitarian actors are forced to hyper-prioritize responses, reducing coverage and sharply cutting rations. Programmes to treat acute malnutrition are being scaled back, leaving millions of children at risk of death. At the same time, funding shortfalls are eroding the ability to collect and analyse reliable food security and nutrition data, weakening the evidence base for effective response. At the start of 2025, Food Security Cluster partners identified 190 million people in need out of 295 million facing IPC/CH Phase 3 (Crisis) or above. Initially, 104 million were targeted. By mid-year, funding shortfalls forced a reduction to 79.8 million, leaving nearly one in four people originally targeted without aid. Funding cuts may drive 13.7 million people in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) towards Emergency levels of hunger. Across Sudan—one of the worst food crises with confirmed famine in El Fasher and Kadugli—only 3.5 million out of 10 million severely and extremely food insecure people are receiving regular monthly food assistance. In Uganda, only 45 per cent of Sudanese refugees received rations in 2025. In Myanmar, 825,000 people did not receive life-saving emergency food assistance, while in Afghanistan, only around 1 million of the most vulnerable people will receive food assistance during the lean season in 2025, compared to 5.6 million during the same period in 2024. By mid-2025, only 16 per cent of people targeted with emergency agriculture were reached, compared to 26 per cent by the same time in 2024. This shortfall means that, looking ahead to 2026, more people will likely require food assistance—at a higher cost than if they had been supported to produce their own food—and many may face worsening acute food insecurity.
  • Health services for 52.6 million people were shuttered or reduced due to underfunding, significantly increasing the risk of preventable death. The funding cuts affected more than 6,600 health facilities across 22 countries (as of 20 September 2025), a third of which were forced to suspend operations. In Sudan alone, more than 180 health facilities are no longer supported, affecting almost 2.7 million people’s ability to access health care services. In Somalia, more than 150 health facilities have closed due to funding cuts, including at least eight hospitals and 40 primary care centres. In Myanmar, 600,000 people will not receive essential healthcare services, supplies or emergency referral services. In Yemen, no health service for communicable diseases was available in 39 per cent of health facilities monitored by the World Health Organization (WHO), while in Libya, this proportion was as high as 41 per cent.

  • Communicable disease outbreaks became harder to prevent and contain, including due to cuts to water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH). In South Sudan, partners struggled to control the spread of cholera due to access and underfunding, while in Chad underfunding stalled investments in water systems and sanitation, undermining efforts to contain the disease. In Syria, WASH partners suspended or decreased their response in more than 350 camps in northeast and northwest Syria, leaving more than 250,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) with limited access to WASH services. Meanwhile, in Yemen, water and sanitation conditions will deteriorate for over 15 million people who are already water insecure. And in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, limited health services combined with reduced water availability, uncollected waste and poor sanitation have increased the risk of disease outbreaks for the Rohingya.
  • Children faced a heightened risk of severe malnutrition and death as nutrition programmes are cut back. In Yemen, one of the worst nutrition crises globally, a staggering 70 per cent of the needs for moderate acute malnutrition are unmet, leaving an estimated 450,000 vulnerable children and mothers without critical care each month. Haiti’s nutrition crisis is at a tipping point: one in three children with acute malnutrition will remain untreated without additional resources, placing over 187,000 children at heightened risk of preventable death. In Somalia, nutrition services declined by 39 per cent in 2025 compared to 2024, with over 60,500 children with Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) missing treatment, alongside 140,000 moderately malnourished children and 17,000 pregnant or lactating women. In Chad, 240,000 children did not receive planned nutrition assistance, and in Burkina Faso, more than one-third of all nutrition programmes—and thousands of children’s lives—are at risk. In Nigeria, the scale down of nutrition programmes in July 2025 affected more than 300,000 children. In areas where clinics closed, malnutrition levels deteriorated from “serious” to “critical” in the third quarter of 2025.

  • Gains in reducing maternal mortality risk immediate reversal, as sexual and reproductive healthcare services are cut. Sixty-two per cent of surveyed partners working on maternal, newborn and child health reported having to downsize their programs, while 37 per cent temporarily suspended activities, and 19 per cent permanently closed initiatives. Support for midwives in crisis settings has been dramatically scaled back, jeopardizing the health and lives of pregnant women and newborns. In Syria, funding cuts are impacting reproductive and maternal health, with 24 safe spaces and service delivery points, 15 hospitals, 54 health facilities and 26 mobile teams at risk of closure.
  • Protection programmes, more broadly, were forced to scale down or stop altogether in multiple countries, increasing the risk of exposure to violence and exploitation. In Nigeria, despite renewed violence, 1.4 million people did not receive protection support. In Afghanistan, protection services for over 3.3 million people, including more than 1.6 million children, could no longer be provided. In Syria, about 2.5 million children, including those with disabilities, remain exposed to the worst forms of violence and exploitation and will not have access to timely child protection preventive and response services. In Uganda, loss of experienced child protection staff has weakened survivor-centered care: by September 2025, child protection cases had surged by 37 per cent to 26,245, compared to the same period in 2024. In Somalia, protection services were halved, affecting 1.7 million people, including 600,000 children. In Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, resource constraints meant lower-risk protection cases were de-prioritized, and limited outreach, legal aid, and psychosocial support placed Rohingya survivors and persons with disabilities at greater risk. Funding cuts have also affected mine action: 65 per cent of the Syrian population (15.4 million people) will continue to be exposed to the risk of explosive ordnance contamination. In Afghanistan, which has one of the world’s highest explosive ordnance casualty rates, the number of mine action teams has decreased by a third, from 300 teams a month to only 176. In Yemen, where funding cuts have halted mine clearance programmes, five children were killed in July while playing football, highlighting the risk that unexploded ordnance poses to all people.

  • Gender-based violence (GBV) response and prevention efforts were reduced or shut down, removing access to vital services for survivors and increasing the risk of harm at a time when GBV is increasing. One-third of women-rights organizations and civil society organizations working to end violence against women reported programme suspension or closure. As of 20 November 2025, only 19 per cent of GBV requirements were funded— forcing decisions about which safe spaces stay open and where the last post-rape kits go. The consequences are already visible: over 460,000 people in West and Central Africa have lost access to GBV services. In the Central African Republic, GBV service coverage dropped from 44 per cent to 22 per cent while in Burkina Faso, only 45,000 people received dignity kits (9 per cent of the target). Seventy-two per cent of localities in northern and central Mali lack any GBV service due to funding shortages.

  • Hundreds of thousands of children’s futures are in jeopardy, as cuts hit education services. In emergencies, schools are more than places of learning: they are safe spaces that provide hope, stability, protection and access to essential services. In Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, underfunding left over 190,000 Rohingya children without education due to closures of 43 per cent of learning facilities and disrupted teaching material distribution including textbooks. In Afghanistan, around 145,000 children (60 per cent girls) will not be able to access education through community-based interventions, and an additional 130,000 children (67,600 girls) will not be reached with a second round of teaching and learning materials. This comes at a time when more than 2.2 million Afghan girls are banned from attending school beyond primary school. In Türkiye, underfunding of the Syria 3RP meant that approximately 250,000 refugee children remained out of school, with 32 per cent of families citing financial difficulties as the primary barrier to enrolling and retaining their children in school. In Uganda, funding cuts forced the layoff of 2,000 teachers, causing the pupil-to-teacher ratio to balloon from 1:77 (2024) to 1:117 (2025)—more than double the national standard of 1:53, with nearly 120 students per classroom. Overall, if funding cuts materialize as envisaged in 2026, 6 million more children—30 per cent of them in humanitarian settings—risk being out of school by the end of 2026 (increasing from 272 million to 276 million).
  • Lack of shelter is leaving millions of people exposed to the elements and violence, while fewer management services risk the quality and functioning of displacement sites and camps. In Myanmar, 1.3 million conflict-affected IDPs and other vulnerable people did not receive shelter and NFI assistance due to funding cuts. In Nigeria, this was the case for 631,000 families. In the DRC, 85 per cent of people targeted for shelter response did not receive assistance. In Chad, 56,000 vulnerable households remained without emergency shelter following the floods. In Haiti, only 91 IDP sites out of 238 sites (38 per cent) had a site manager, leaving more than 110,000 displaced people without structured management or coordination of essential services. In Somalia, Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) partners ceased operations in 15 districts, suspending services for 900,000 IDPs.

  • Cash and voucher assistance (CVA)—including multi-purpose cash—has been drastically reduced in multiple countries. CVA is projected to drop precipitously in 2025, after already decreasing in 2024 as a proportion of humanitarian assistance. In Somalia, only 273,000 people (29 per cent of the target) received multipurpose cash assistance. In Sudan, over 250,000 people did not receive cash-based individual protection assistance. In Lebanon, more than 300,000 vulnerable households will remain without critical cash support through 2026 if funding is not received, forcing families to resort to harmful coping mechanisms such as reducing meals, accumulating debt, or engaging in child labour and child marriage. In CAR, the number of people receiving cash and voucher assistance decreased by 76 per cent (or three quarters), from 407, 000 people in mid-2024 to 96,000 people mid-2025.

  • Services for refugees and migrants have been hit hard. In Ethiopia (Sudan Regional Refugee Response Plan), without sufficient resources, over 30,000 new arrivals will be excluded from registration and national ID systems, undermining their access to protection and basic services. In Lebanon (Syria 3RP), around 1.4 million people risk losing access to primary health care, with essential refugee health services expected to phase out by the end of 2025. In Somalia (Horn of Africa Migrant Response Plan), only about 5 per cent of the more than 30,000 transit movements recorded since the start of 2025 received assistance. By the end of September 2025, only 21 per cent of the 493,400 people targeted under the Venezuela Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan (RMRP) had been reached, while protection monitoring confirmed that unmet humanitarian needs are increasingly translating into harmful coping mechanisms, irregular movements, and social tensions in host communities.
  • Funding cuts also compromised critical enablers that are the backbone of coordinated humanitarian responses. The United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) was forced to suspend or reduce flights in countries such as Afghanistan and Nigeria, while other air operations were on the precipice of collapse due to inadequate or delayed funding. In CAR, warehouses closed, a helicopter departed the country and the Logistics Cluster was only able to transport half of the planned emergency airfreight cargo to hard-to-reach communities. In Yemen, the Displacement Tracking Matrix was suspended in March 2025, blinding the response from the analysis and assessment side.

And yet, the funding requested for humanitarian action was extremely modest in comparison to other expenditures and/or profits globally. It amounts to less than one per cent of global military expenditure (which has reached over $2.7 trillion) or less than half a per cent of the global banking industry’s profits. With a minor adjustment of these priorities and/or donation of these profits, global humanitarian action could be immediately and fully funded.

Under fire: humanitarians killed, injured and threatened

At least 320 aid workers had been killed across 23 countries by the end of November 2025,98 per cent of whom were national staff serving in their own communities and/or countries. OPT remained the most dangerous place in the world for aid workers, with 120 incidents recorded, followed by South Sudan (65 incidents) and Sudan (39 incidents) in 2025 alone. This comes on the back of the deadliest year for humanitarians on record in 2024, when more than 380 aid workers were killed across 20 countries. Both 2025 and 2024 significantly surpass the 3-year average of 267 aid workers killed annually.

Number of aid workers killed (2010–2025)

Humanitarians also face the politicization of their work, misinformation regarding their efforts, and bureaucratic impediments that limit access to people who need help the most. Aid workers are regularly interrogated and accused of supporting terrorism, simply for delivering aid to people in need. In Yemen, Sana'a-based authorities have detained 59 UN personnel, some since 2021. In addition, dozens of current and former personnel from national and international NGOs, civil society organizations and diplomatic missions remain in detention. In Nigeria, hard-to-reach populations experienced significant service gaps due to non-State armed group restrictions, limiting coverage and increasing operational costs. In Cameroon, lockdowns imposed by non-State armed groups and seasonal damage to key roads have constrained humanitarian access and delayed life-saving assistance. In Sudan, hundreds of thousands of civilians were under siege in El Fasher, and siege-like conditions in Kadugli and Dilling are making it near impossible for humanitarian actors to provide lifesaving aid. And in Colombia, access restrictions and insecurity in 167 municipalities left 330,000 people without regular aid. Meanwhile, coordination with Israeli authorities continues to be required for humanitarian convoy movements in Gaza, with multiple denials received each week. It is estimated that since May 2024, more than 900 patients have died in Gaza, OPT, while awaiting clearance for medical evacuation. Meanwhile, in the West Bank, OPT, repetitive military incursions—on average 30 per day—have restricted access to health, education and water. Refugee camps and communities are increasingly isolated, with limited service provision and governance gaps.

Attacks against aid workers and humanitarian, health and education facilities disrupt critical assistance and protection for people in crisis. In OPT, attacks against aid workers and health facilities—combined with the adoption of legislation by the Israeli Knesset aimed at debilitating the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and the planned deregistration of NGOs—have significantly undercut the humanitarian response. UNRWA plays a particularly important role in OPT, having provided Palestinians with quality education, comprehensive primary health care, protection and other services for over 75 years. In the Central African Republic (CAR), there were 126 incidents affecting aid workers, with violence and intimidation rising by more than half. As of 1 December 2025, the World Health Organization (WHO) reported that health facilities in zoned affected by conflict and insecurity are about eight times more likely to be non-operational than those in non-conflict zones, based on monitoring in 17 GHO countries. Half of health facilities operating in conflict zones monitored by WHO reported major operational constraints. In Sudan, 53 attacks against health care have been recorded since the start of 2025, killing more than 1,400 patients and health care workers. At the same time, there has been a threefold increase in the number of attacks on schools in the last five years, rising to 2,445 attacks in 2024 (the latest available year) compared to 790 in 2020. In Mali alone, over 2,000 schools are closed due to insecurity and violence, affecting more than 610,000 children and 12,200 teachers.

And yet, no recent major attacks against aid workers have been prosecuted and punished. The adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2730 (2024), which calls on all States to respect and protect humanitarian workers, and the adoption of a new Declaration for the Protection of Humanitarian Personnel in September 2025 emphasized that attacks against aid workers should not be tolerated. Urgent action is required to convert these commitments into practice, to reverse the trend of attacks against aid workers, to protect the people they serve and to hold the perpetrators of attacks to account.

References

  1. Data retrieved from the Financial Tracking Service (FTS) on 20 November 2025. FTS figures will continue to evolve as reports arrive, and the final funding figures for 2025 will likely be different to those included in this edition of the GHO.
  2. International aid from official donors fell in 2024 by 7.1% in real terms compared to 2023, the first drop after five years of consecutive growth.
  3. Internal analysis by OCHA Colombia. This corresponds to a decrease in main partners (from 39 to 34, a reduction of 5 partners) compared to the same period in 2024, according to the 5W response activity reports
  4. Unless otherwise specified, data presented in this article covers the period January – November 2025. Data in this article was provided directly by country operations, humanitarian partners/NGOs, clusters and UN agencies. For more country-specific information on cost of inaction/gaps consult the following document on Mozambique.
  5. The expected number of people reached may increase until country teams conclude their 2025 response monitoring. Expected reach figures do not include OPT.
  6. At the time of launch of the GHO 2025, the expected people reached was nearly 116 million. This figure increased to 123 million people once country teams concluded their response monitoring for 2024.
  7. Afghanistan, Bangladesh - Rohingya (JRP), Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Lebanon (FA), Malawi (FA), Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Ukraine, Venezuela, Viet Nam (FA).
  8. From a target of 50,000 households to just over 15,800 households.
  9. Global Health Cluster Monitoring of impact of defunding on Health Cluster response, internal report, 20 September 2025. This accounts for 65 per cent of the 81 million people originally targeted to receive humanitarian health assistance.
  10. Data retrieved from Financial Tracking Service.
  11. Data retrieved 20 November 2025, Aid Worker Security Database.
  12. Incidents include killing, wounding and kidnapping.
  13. Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Bangladesh (Cox’s Bazar), Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo (Ituri), Ethiopia, Haiti, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Mozambique (Northeast), Niger, Nigeria (Northeast), OPT, Sudan, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic (Northeast), Ukraine, Yemen.
  14. Global Health Cluster Monitoring of impact of defunding on Health Cluster response, internal report, 20 September 2025.