Syria entered a new era, and the humanitarian context significantly shifted following the change of authorities on 8 December 2024. Humanitarian needs, however, remain extensive, due to the impact of years of prolonged conflict, climatic-induced shocks and a deterioration in the socio-economic situation. While there are ongoing efforts to stabilize the country and a transitional government has been installed, humanitarian indicators are expected to deteriorate further due to several factors. These include insecurity and instability, which have resulted in new waves of displacement, particularly among minority communities, the impact of severe drought-like conditions (the worst in 36 years) the country is experiencing, lack of significant improvements in the socio-economic conditions and a funding crisis that has further curtailed the capacity of the humanitarian community to adequately respond.
Since the change of authorities on 8 December 2024, hostilities and insecurity remain active across Syria, particularly in eastern rural Aleppo, the north-eastern and southern parts of the country, and most recently in the coastal governorates. This has resulted in civilian casualties, displacement, movement restrictions, and damage to vital infrastructure, including water infrastructure, bridges and markets, and interruptions in basic service provision and humanitarian assistance programmes. Humanitarian access remains a challenge in the north-eastern parts of the country, some areas in As-Sweida, and Quneitra, with internal and external border crossings across Syria in various states of functioning. Attacks on healthcare facilities continue to severely undermine an already fragile healthcare system. Between January 2024 and 8 December 2024, 57 attacks on health facilities were reported, resulting in 130 injuries and 22 deaths-including healthcare personnel and damage of health facilities and ambulances. Following the change in authorities, between 9 December 2024 and 31 May 2025, 40 attacks on health facilities were reported, resulting in 14 injuries and 39 deaths-including healthcare personnel and damage of health facilities and ambulances.
While the country continues to grapple with a protracted displacement crisis, between November 2024 and June 2025, about 680,000 people were newly internally displaced, including 463,000 newly displaced people and 216,000 people who were secondarily displaced. Of these over five per cent are people living with disabilities. Parallel to the displacement response, there are ongoing efforts to support returns, as Syrians who were displaced both inside and outside of the country voluntarily return. With the support of the Syrian interim Government, some milestones achievements have been attained to date. According to the latest estimates provided by the IDP Taskforce, about 1.23 million IDP Returnees have so far returned, including 601,400 who were displaced before 27 November 2024, and 579,700 from IDP sitesFurther, UNHCR reports that since 8 December 2024, 628,029 Syrian refugees have returned to the country, bringing the total number of those who returned since the beginning of 2024 to 988,869. The returns have primarily been from Lebanon, Türkiye, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt.
The findings of the most recent intentions survey indicate that many others wish to return, but face several challenges, including the lack of essential services and job opportunities, risks from unexploded munitions, and missing legal documents. According to the finding of the latest IDP return intentions’ survey, in Aleppo and Idlib, about 600,000 IDPs are expected to return before the end of summer, while another 1 million expressed their intent to return in 2025 or early 2026. Conversely, only 11 per cent of IDPs in Al-Hasakeh, Ar-Raqqa and Deir-ez-Zor indicated their intention to return to their areas of origin, due to a number of challenges, including lack of access to livelihood opportunities and basic services. The humanitarian community is dedicated to supporting safe and dignified returns and addressing the immediate needs of returnees.
Further compounding an already fragile humanitarian situation is the severe drought-like conditions Syria is experiencing (the worst in over 36 years)with devastating countrywide impacts on staple crops and livestock, access to water and related public health implications. According to the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the 2024 wheat harvest fell to just 2 million tons, nearly 50 per cent below pre-crisis levels. In 2025, only 40 per cent of farmlands were cultivated, and much of it has been devastated by the drought-like conditions. Key Syrian agricultural regions, including Aleppo, Al-Hasakeh, Dar’a, Hama, Homs and Idlib, have experienced catastrophic losses in cultivation of wheat and barley, exceeding 95 per cent in rainfed areas.
A projected wheat deficit of 2.73 million metric tons in 2025 risks leaving over 16 million people without sufficient dietary needs. This comes at a time when the country is already grappling with a food insecurity crisis with 14.6 million people assessed to be food insecure, out of whom 9.1 million are classified as acutely food insecure and 1.4 million are severely food insecure. Nutrition indicators have also continued a declining trend: more than 600,000 children under 5 years of age are acutely malnourished and require treatment to save their lives, with more than 177,000 severely wasted.
Syria’s vulnerability to climate-induced shocks is heightened by the long-lasting impacts of conflict and compounded by water scarcity. The average Syrian has access to only 355 m³ of clean water per year. A 15 per cent rainfall deficit in 2023 further restricted water access for 8.5 million people, including 1.8 million already severely affected. Increasingly frequent climate anomalies induce natural hazards, such as prolonged, extreme heatwaves and winters as well as erratic rainfall, and unpredictable cycles of drought-like conditions and flooding. These exacerbate Syria's water scarcity and pose serious risks to human, animal, and plant health.
Large-scale movement of people has highlighted the gravity of the threat from explosive remnants of war: years of conflict have resulted in unprecedented levels of EO contamination. In December 2024 alone, the number of casualties from EO tripled from previous months, with children accounting for about 50 per cent of casualties. Threats from EO remain one of the main safety risks for Syrian civilians as they try to provide for their families and go about their daily lives. According to the Mine Action Area of Responsibility (MA AoR) between 8 December 2024 and 1 June 2025, 532 EO incidents took place, resulting in 1,052 casualties (360 children), with 428 killed (107 children) and 624 (253 children) injured. EO contamination remains particularly severe in Aleppo, Ar Raqqa, Deir-ez-Zor, Hama and Idlib governorates, with Deir-ez-Zor alone accounting for at least a quarter of all EO accidents.
In addition to insecurity and ongoing displacement, the economic situation remains dire across Syria, compounded by declining public services. While prices have stabilized, living conditions continue to be strained by reduced purchasing power and challenges with banking transactions and liquidity. Additionally, fuel, electricity and water shortages continue to be reported across governorates.
Regional conflicts have increasingly impacted Syria. Hostilities in Lebanon since September 2024 have displaced about 562,000 people into Syria (63 per cent Syrians and 37 per cent Lebanese or other nationals), with almost 3,000 Lebanese refugees crossing back into Lebanon immediately following the ceasefire in Lebanon. This influx has increased the stress on an already fragile humanitarian situation, straining Syria's limited resources and placing additional pressure on essential services. At the launch of the Global Humanitarian Overview 2025, the Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan (3RP) included planning figures from the Inter-Agency Emergency Appeal for the Influx from Lebanon to Syria, which launched in October 2024 and ran until March 2025.
Syria’s economic crisis, characterized by soaring inflation, currency devaluation, and rising commodity and services prices, continues to drive needs across the country. Since 15 December 2024 and in the first quarter of 2025, severe liquidity shortages across the country have impacted humanitarian programs, leading to suspensions of operations and significant delays. Following the facilitation of the Syrian interim Government, alternatives including the use of foreign currency to transact were put in place as stopgap measures despite the ongoing challenges. In addition, financial institutions, retailers, suppliers, and service providers have struggled to meet their obligations due to a shortage of Syrian pounds. The worsening liquidity crisis is deepening humanitarian challenges, particularly for households already struggling to meet their basic needs. With 90 per cent of Syrians living below the poverty line, many families are being forced to cut spending on essentials such as food, water, healthcare, and education.
The cost of living, as measured by the minimum expenditure basket (MEB), rose by 21 per cent in a year and more than tripled in just two years. Given this rise in costs, the minimum wage can only cover 16 per cent of the food component of the MEB, reflecting the growing challenges families face in meeting their basic needs. This economic hardship, combined with limited employment opportunities, is pushing more households into poverty and aid dependency, driving up response costs and eroding the impact of humanitarian efforts. Furthermore, economic downturn has pushed people to rely on farming and animal grazing to provide for families, often on farmland known to be contaminated with EO, thus increasing the risk from death and injury. Effects of the economic crisis impact female headed households and other vulnerable groups, such as women, adolescent girls, and persons with disabilities (PWD) more systematically, increasing the risks of various forms of gender-based violence (GBV) and the use of negative coping mechanisms, such as child marriage, child labour and sexual exploitation, among others. The World Bank’s economic update in October 2024 forecast that Syria’s gross domestic product will contract by 1 per cent in 2025, while extreme poverty is projected to increase from 33.1 per cent in 2024 to 37.4 per cent in 2025.
The shifts in the context, new displacement waves, and new needs arising necessitate an update to the figures related to humanitarian needs to enable the humanitarian community to design and implement an efficient and timely response. During January- February 2025, the Whole of Syria (WoS) assessment and analysis working group (AAWG) conducted the WoS rapid needs assessment (RNA) covering 33 per cent of the 7,950 affected communities across Syria, covering population composition at both the camp and community levels.
The assessment provides a comprehensive analysis of humanitarian needs, spanning all sectors, while also integrating cross-cutting themes such as inter-sectoral priorities, accountability to affected people (AAP), protection from sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA), gender, and access. The data was collected after 8 December 2024 and offers a critical evidence base to inform response planning, identify urgent gaps, and strengthen humanitarian interventions across Syria. The Inter-Sector Coordination Group (ISCG) has agreed on the timelines and process for an MSNA to be conducted in the third quarter of 2025 to support the 2026 Humanitarian Programme Cycle (HPC).