Afghanistan

Crisis overview

Afghanistan will remain one of the world’s largest humanitarian crises in 2026, despite a modest reduction in the overall number of people in need. Years of conflict, economic fragility, underinvestment in basic services and the rapid erosion of rights have left large segments of the population with diminished resilience. These chronic stresses are now compounded by worsening food insecurity, large-scale cross-border returns, climate-driven drought, recurrent natural hazards, and the systematic exclusion of women and

girls from public life. In 2026, around 21.9 million people – approximately 45 per cent of the population – are projected to require humanitarian assistance, reflecting the combined impact of overlapping shocks and deep structural vulnerability.

Governance

More than four years after the Taliban takeover, Afghanistan continues to be governed by a de facto authority that enforces strict social and legal regulations, severely curtailing civic space, restricting freedom of expression and assembly, and limiting access to justice. Since August 2021, hundreds of cases of killings, arbitrary arrest and detention, enforced disappearance, torture and ill-treatment have been documented, underscoring persistent protection risks and the fragility of the rule of law.¹ Journalists, civil society actors and minority communities continue to face threats, harassment and violence.²

Towards the end of year, the DfA implemented a series of telecommunications shutdowns across the country, culminating in a 48-hour nationwide internet and mobile network blackout from 29 September to 1 October.

The shutdown was imposed without prior notification and in the absence of any official public justification.³ These events underscored the DfA’s highly centralised control over digital infrastructure, as well as the lack of transparent regulatory frameworks and accountability mechanisms governing access to information and communications, with direct implications for civic space, service delivery and humanitarian operations.

Women and girls continue to experience the most severe and systematic erosion of rights. Since August 2021, the DfA has issued at least 470 directives (with direct or indirect implications on humanitarian action), 79 of which directly target women and girls, restricting freedom of movement and participation in education, employment, the economy and public life.⁴ These include bans on secondary, tertiary and medical education, Islamic dress code requirements and prohibitions on women’s employment with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (December 2022) and the UN (April 2023).⁵ These measures have profoundly reshaped the socio-economic landscape, dramatically reducing women’s access to livelihoods and services while heightening risks of gender-based violence (GBV), psychosocial distress and negative coping strategies. In 2025, the heightened enforcement of existing directives targeting women and girls, together with newly introduced restrictions

Infrastructure and service delivery constraints

Limited state capacity to manage natural hazards, climatic shocks and mass population movements continue to constrain national service systems.

Insufficient international development assistance and limited public investment have accelerated the deterioration of water systems, irrigation networks, flood protection systems including dams, health and education facilities, electricity networks and roads, many of which now operate well below functional standards.

These weaknesses are occurring amid rapid demographic growth spurred on by large-scale returns and high-birth rates, which in turn is accelerating urbanisation and driving unprecedented demand on already overstretched services. As in previous years, in 2025 the DfA remained primarily focused on maintaining security and promoting large-scale infrastructure and economic projects, with essential service provision such as healthcare and education continuing to rely heavily on support from humanitarian and basic human needs actors.

The nationwide telecommunications and internet shutdown in late September–October 2025 highlighted the reliance of the country on telecommunications to be able to function and revealed its direct implications for service delivery and humanitarian operations.

Banking systems ceased functioning, ATMs were suspended, and domestic and international transfers halted, disrupting remittances, salary payments and humanitarian cash assistance. Humanitarian coordination was severely affected: emergency referrals were delayed, biometric registration of returnees was suspended, and congestion at border transit facilities increased sharply. While services were subsequently restored, the event underscored the growing intersection between infrastructure fragility, centralised decision-making over critical services and heightened humanitarian, protection and access risks.

Security

Since August 2021, the security landscape has fundamentally shifted. The end of large-scale hostilities has led to a substantial reduction in active fighting, conflict-related shocks and overall civilian casualties, alongside improved physical access for humanitarian actors.⁶ These changes have enabled partners to reach previously inaccessible and underserved areas more consistently, and in turn allowed affected communities to access assistance and services, broader geographic reach and more consistent response delivery.

Geopolitical tensions with Pakistan intensified throughout 2025, driven by continued Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) attacks on Pakistani security forces.

The situation escalated sharply in October and resulted in the most significant cross-border violence since August 2021. Air strikes in Kabul and Kandahar Provinces caused more than 50 fatalities and over 500 civilian casualties within a ten-day period.⁷ The clashes prompted the prolonged closure of key border crossing points, delayed the movement of critical humanitarian supplies and disrupted trade. At the time of writing (21 December), the border crossing remains closed. Pakistan has publicly indicated that it considers the DfA a legitimate target and that operations will continue as long as TTP elements are perceived to be operating from Afghan territory.⁸ Multiple mediation efforts have so far failed to produce progress, contributing to a heightened and unpredictable security environment.⁹

These border-related tensions continued to affect eastern and southeastern Afghanistan in late 2025, generating additional humanitarian pressures on already fragile communities. Heightened security measures and intermittent restrictions at key crossing points contributed to delays in the movement of commercial goods and relief items, further straining local markets and complicating timely humanitarian delivery in high-need districts. These disruptions, alongside periodic cross-border military activity, heightened anxiety among border populations, triggered short-term displacement in affected areas, and increased protection risks for civilians.

Overall, while the post-2021 security environment has enabled expanded humanitarian access and reduced large-scale armed conflict, ongoing explosive hazards and localized insecurity continue to pose protection risks and shape humanitarian needs in several parts of the country.

Economy

Structural economic constraints remain long-standing drivers of need across Afghanistan. While no major new economic shock has occurred in 2025, decades of conflict and instability have left the country with damaged infrastructure, weakened institutions and limited private-sector development. Low agricultural productivity, driven by outdated practices, water scarcity and land degradation continue to undermine rural livelihoods. The economy remains highly dependent on agriculture and international assistance, with limited integration into regional and global markets following the 2021 political transition and a plethora of international sanctions.¹⁰

Multi-dimensional poverty in Afghanistan remains widespread, with 65 per cent of the population living in acute poverty and nearly four in 10 people (39 percent) experiencing severe multi-dimensional deprivation, rising to 75 per cent in rural areas.¹¹ Most families rely on daily wage labour, subsistence agriculture and informal micro-businesses, leaving them acutely exposed to market volatility, seasonal shocks and sudden disruptions. Overlapping deficits in nutrition, education, housing, water and basic assets are directly reinforcing food insecurity, weak livelihood recovery and negative coping strategies, leaving millions of households highly vulnerable to economic, climatic and displacement-related shocks.¹² The return of more than 2.61 million Afghans in 2025 alone¹³ has placed extraordinary strain on already fragile local communities and their economies, particularly in rural districts with limited absorptive capacity. Most returnees arrived involuntarily and without assets or documentation, intensifying competition for employment, land, housing and water. As a result, host communities in high-return areas are operating at the limits of their coping capacity.

Women face the most acute forms of economic exclusion. Continued restrictions on the rights of women have deepened their social and economic marginalisation. The Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (PVPV) Law introduced in August 2024 formalised existing restrictions and introduced additional, more restrictive measures, further undermining women’s ability to access public spaces and to participate in social, economic and community life.¹⁴ This is reflected in a female labour force participation that remains around 6 per cent, with most women confined to informal, home-based or survival-level income activities, often linked to debt.¹⁵ Female-headed households consistently identify income and housing security as their most critical unmet needs, yet face the greatest structural barriers to mobility, employment, finance and documentation.¹⁶ Economic pressure is also contributing to negative coping strategies, including child labour and early marriage, particularly in high-return districts in southern Afghanistan.¹⁷

Together, chronic poverty, labour market contraction, widespread indebtedness, large-scale returns, insufficient basic services, and recurrent climatic and seismic shocks continue to lock millions of Afghans into a cycle of vulnerability. This underscores that humanitarian needs in Afghanistan are structurally embedded rather than episodic, and that life-saving assistance must be closely aligned with basic human needs (BHN) efforts - particularly in high-return, drought-affected and disaster-impacted areas.

Food security and nutrition

Food insecurity and acute malnutrition remain among the most severe and widespread drivers of humanitarian need in Afghanistan. During the 2025–2026 lean season (November–March), an estimated 17.4 million people – more than one-third of the population – are projected to face Crisis or worse food insecurity (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification [IPC] Phase 3+), including 4.7 million experiencing emergency (IPC Phase 4) levels.¹⁸ This represents a sharp deterioration compared to the previous year.¹⁹ Although above-average 2025 harvests and food assistance helped prevent even worse outcomes, food insecurity levels remain significantly higher than pre-2021 conditions and are expected to persist into 2026.²⁰ The ongoing drought has resulted in a nearly 80 per cent failure of rainfed wheat crops in several northern and western provinces, leaving many households without own-produced food stocks for the winter.²¹ Livestock body conditions have deteriorated sharply due to pasture and fodder shortages, triggering widespread distress sales and herd losses of up to 50 per cent in the most affected areas.²²

These food security shocks combined with communicable disease outbreaks are directly driving a worsening nutrition crisis. 3.7 million children under five are projected to suffer from acute malnutrition in 2026, including 942,000 with Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM), while 1.2 million pregnant and breastfeeding women (PBW) are also expected to be acutely malnourished. High disease burden, poor dietary diversity, limited WASH coverage and constrained access to health and nutrition services continue to compound nutritional risk.

Climate, environment and natural disasters

Afghanistan remains acutely exposed to escalating climate and environmental shocks that are driving humanitarian need and undermining recovery. The country is now entering a sixth consecutive year of meteorological and hydrological drought, with groundwater levels nationwide in the bottom 30th percentile of historical records, and in much of the country in the bottom 5th percentile.²³ In 2025 alone, drought severely affected large parts of the northern and western regions, with approximately 3.4 million people affected in 12 provinces across at least 65 districts, impacting food production, livestock health and rural incomes.²⁴ These climatic pressures are compounded by chronic water mismanagement, degraded irrigation infrastructure and widespread over-extraction of groundwater, which continue to undermine agricultural production and intensify competition for scarce water resources.²⁵ Rural households dependent on rain-fed farming and pastoralism are among the most exposed.

Restricted access to safe water is also increasing the risk of acute watery diarrhoea (AWD) and other water-borne diseases, with direct consequences for malnutrition, child survival and public health.

Afghanistan has experienced four major magnitude 6+ earthquakes in the past four years, including a particularly devastating seismic event in the eastern region in August 2025. In this region, large proportions of the population, including returnees, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and poor rural households, reside in non-engineered structures highly susceptible to collapse, amplifying mortality, injury and displacement risks when earthquakes occur.²⁶ Albeit at a lesser scale in 2025 than previous years, floods, flash floods, landslides and avalanches present a perpetual threat in Afghanistan - routinely destroying homes and markets, displacing communities, damaging transport and irrigation infrastructure and disrupting access to basic services. Climate change, deforestation and unplanned urban expansion are further amplifying the scale and severity of these hazards.

Returns crisis

Afghanistan is facing one of the world’s largest and fastest-growing returnee-related displacement crises. Over the past two years, approximately 5 million people - equivalent to 10 per cent of Afghanistan’s total population - have returned to the country.^{27 28} In 2025 alone, more than 2.61 million Afghans returned from Iran (1.8 million) and Pakistan (805,000) of whom 31 per cent were women and girls,²⁹ driven primarily by tightened migration policies, mass deportations and deteriorating protection environments in neighbouring countries. The majority of returnees arrived in Balkh, Faryab, Herat, Kabul and Kunduz provinces, without assets, savings or complete civil documentation, and many returned to districts already severely affected by poverty, food insecurity, drought and limited access to basic services. Many returning women have experienced GBV and other protection-related risks during the return process and have high needs for mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS). The most commonly reported protection concerns for returning women include restricted freedom of movement, violence against women, family violence, harassment and intimidation, and denial of humanitarian assistance. According to IOM protection monitoring for Q3 2025, 60 per cent of interviewed returnee women reported that they are unable to move freely.

These large-scale returns are compounding existing internal displacement and placing extraordinary pressure on housing, land, water, education, health services and labour markets, eastern and southern regions and urban-adjacent districts. The large influx of returnees is placing further strain on already overstretched local labour markets and household purchasing power, contributing to rising food insecurity.³⁰ In several areas of high return, including Daykundi, Faryab, and Ghor Provinces, the combination of drought-induced harvest failure, sharp declines in agricultural labour demand and surging population pressures are driving Emergency (IPC Phase 4) conditions at the onset of the 2026 lean season.³¹

Large-scale returns are also reshaping vulnerability patterns across Afghanistan in ways that extend beyond immediate absorption capacities. A growing proportion of new returnees face an elevated risk of secondary displacement into informal settlements (ISETs) and rural areas. Many women return without identity documentation, limiting their ability to access assistance and essential services, while restrictions on movement and employment further constrain their economic recovery.³² Loss of remittance income, previously a critical coping mechanism for many households, is accelerating negative survival strategies, including child labour, early marriage and distressed asset sales.³³

At scale, the returns crisis is a major structural multiplier of humanitarian need, deepening protection risks, driving food insecurity and placing lasting strain on Afghanistan’s already fragile social and service infrastructure.

Protection crisis and gendered impacts

Afghanistan remains fundamentally a protection crisis that continues to deepen under the combined pressures of mass forced returns, increasing restrictions on the population – especially for women and girls – economic hardship, as well as regular natural and climate-related disasters. The accelerated enforcement of restrictive policies throughout 2025 – including the PVPV law and tightening mahram requirements - has further curtailed women’s and girls’ rights and access to education, work and public spaces. Protection risks have escalated sharply as formal and community- ased protection systems have been significantly undermined and access to services increasingly constrained. Restrictions on women’s and girls’ movement are widespread,³⁴ with an estimated 77 per cent of respondents reporting mobility limitations due to cultural or political reasons.³⁵ Consistent with this, 70 per cent of households countrywide report areas where women and girls feel unsafe,³⁶ while 63 per cent indicate that they or someone they know have been denied access to services due to social or legal restrictions.³⁷

Women and children face the most acute protection risks, including gender-based violence, child marriage, child labour, trafficking, family separation and psychological distress. A comparative analysis of the 2024 and 2025 Whole of Afghanistan Assessment (WoAA) indicates a deterioration in child protection outcomes, with increases in both child labour and child marriage.³⁸ The number of parents and caregivers reporting that they had sent children to work outside the home rose from 1,977 in 2024 to 4,938 in 2025, while reported cases of child marriage increased from 323 to 746 over the same period. More than 80 per cent of child protection partners continue to identify child marriage and child labour as negative coping mechanisms adopted by families. Between January and November 2025, a total of 43,588 children with protection concerns were identified, including 7,369 unaccompanied and separated children and 24,520 children who experienced grave violations of their rights.³⁹

In 2025, intensified restrictions on women’s movement and employment further limited the ability of women and girls to access services, participate in assessments, community consultations and accountability mechanisms. Women, particularly women-headed households (WHH), face significant information and access barriers: 66 per cent of WHH, compared to 52 per cent of male-headed households, do not know how to access assistance, while 74 per cent, compared to 67 per cent, do not understand how programme participants are selected.⁴⁰

These information gaps intersect with higher levels of unmet need, with WHH more frequently reporting insufficient food (79 per cent versus 69 per cent) and lack of safe drinking water (54 per cent versus 46 per cent) compared to male-headed households.⁴¹ Together, these dynamics underscore how constrained access, limited information and reduced voice compound vulnerability for women and girls and undermine the effectiveness and accountability of humanitarian assistance. Afghanistan remains one of the world’s most heavily contaminated countries by explosive ordnance (EO), with reverberating humanitarian consequences.

Since 1999, over 15,000 Afghan children have been killed or injured by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO), representing 43 per cent of global child casualties from UXO and mines.⁴² This includes more than 40 people killed or injured each month in 2025, with children comprising roughly three-quarters of those affected.⁴³ As of November 2025, more than 1,079 square kilometres of land remain contaminated by known EO hazards across 4,719 confirmed sites nationwide. The largest share of contaminated land affects grazing areas (772 sq km), followed by housing and public infrastructure (157 sq km) and agricultural land (122 sq km), directly constraining food production, livestock movement, safe shelter and access to water infrastructure.⁴⁴ Contamination affects 257 districts and 1,593 communities, with an estimated 2.71 million people living within one kilometre of hazardous areas, alongside 369 education facilities and 193 health facilities in high-risk proximity.⁴⁵ These conditions continue to endanger civilian lives, exacerbate food insecurity, increase protection risks during livelihood activities, impede safe returns, and delay recovery and reintegration. The challenge of sporadic EO hazards incidents causing civilian casualties and creating barriers to humanitarian and development activities should not be ignored, underscoring the urgent need to scale up mine action, risk education and victim assistance in 2026.

The convergence of large-scale displacement, EO contamination, economic vulnerability and gender-related restrictions is intensifying protection risks across multiple population groups. Women, children, persons with disabilities, minorities, returnees and female-headed households face intersecting and compounding risks. Continued investment in gender-responsive and child-centred protection will be vital in 2026 to safeguard vulnerable populations and support the integrity of protective environments.