In 2026, an estimated 21.9 million people in Afghanistan – nearly half of the total population – require humanitarian assistance, reflecting a modest four per cent decrease compared to 2025. This slight reduction does not indicate an easing of the crisis. On the contrary, key drivers of vulnerability, particularly food insecurity, have continued to worsen. The lower overall People in Need (PiN) figure reflects the Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan’s (HNRP) sharpened, shock-based scope which prioritises those facing immediate, life-threatening risks and represents a refinement in planning boundaries. It does not signal an improvement in underlying humanitarian conditions.
Of the 21.9 million people in need in 2026, 4.6 million live in districts classified as inter-sector severity 4 while 17 million live in districts classified as inter-sector severity 3, and 284,200 people are located in pockets of need across 15 inter-sector severity 2 districts. Compared with 2025, the number of people living in inter-sector severity 4 districts has decreased by approximately 25 per cent (from 6.3 million to 4.6 million), alongside a reduction in the number of inter-sector severity 4 districts from 95 to 86. This decline aligns with an average 31 per cent reduction in people in need across five clusters (Education, Emergency Shelter and Non-Food Items (ES/NFI), Health, Protection, WASH), indicating a moderation of inter-sectoral pressures in some locations.
However, this overall improvement masks important geographic shifts in severity. Several districts (47 districts) have deteriorated from inter- ectoral severity 3 to 4, particularly in parts of the west, south and southeast, reflecting the compound effects of drought, returnee pressure and natural disasters. At the same time, 55 districts have shifted from inter-sectoral severity 4 to 3, notably in parts of the north and northeast, suggesting localised stabilisation, seasonal recovery or sustained assistance. Nevertheless, these gains remain fragile and highly exposed to renewed shocks.
These positive shifts have been partially offset by an increase in the number of people in IPC 3+ and above, contributing to a 25 per cent rise in sectoral food security need for 2026. As a result, while there have been meaningful reductions in severity in some areas, overall humanitarian needs remain significant, with large populations still concentrated in high-severity classifications.
At the same time, the highest-severity needs areas have shifted westward in 2026, compared to the stronger northeastern concentration observed in 2025, reflecting evolving patterns of drought impact and return-related pressures. While high-severity needs remain pronounced in the eastern, central highlands and southern regions, there is now a clearer disbursement of inter-sector severity 4 districts in parts of the west and northwest regions, where prolonged drought, groundwater depletion and a high number of returns have been recorded. This westward shift complements climate and food security analysis, which continues to highlight elevated risk in northern rain-fed zones.
Concurrently, inter-sector severity 2 and severity 3 caseloads have slightly increased (from 16.5 million in 2025 to 17.3 million in 2026), reflecting a wider geographic diffusion of moderate needs as shocks and livelihood erosion spread across a broader set of districts. In 2026, 15 districts across Kabul, Kapisa, Khost, Logar, Maidan Wardak, Nimroz and Parwan have shifted from inter-sectoral severity 3 to severity 2. While this represents a localised easing of severity, high levels of humanitarian need persist across multiple regions, indicating that shocks continue to compound and that conditions remain fragile.
Overall, humanitarian needs in 2026 remain widespread and significant. Large absolute numbers of people in need are concentrated in densely populated eastern, northeastern and southeastern provinces, as well as in major urban and peri-urban areas. Although pockets of lower severity persist, no province is free from humanitarian need, underscoring the nationwide nature of the crisis and the continued requirement for a principled, prioritised and severity-driven response.
Methodology
The 2026 HNRP inter-sectoral severity and PiN analysis is anchored in a shock-based and time-bound planning framework. The analytical model is structured around five core shock types: drought, large-scale return movements, AWD (as a proxy for malnutrition and outbreak risks), sudden-onset natural disasters, and the residual impacts of the 2025 eastern region earthquake. This framework ensures that the HNRP remains firmly centred on life-saving humanitarian action, while longer-term structural drivers such as economic stress, inadequate and uneven basic service delivery and climate trends are primarily addressed through Basic Human Needs (BHN) frameworks. While the policies of the DfA are not classified as shocks, having been a consistent feature of governance since August 2021, their humanitarian and protection impacts, particularly on women and girls, are fully reflected in the severity and vulnerability analysis.
The 2026 PiN is derived from a hybrid model that combines districts affected by clearly defined shocks with districts demonstrating severe inter-sectoral convergence. This approach ensures that the analysis reflects both acute shock-driven emergencies and less visible, hidden crises where convergence of layered deprivations produces severe and life-threatening needs.
Most affected groups
Women and girls
Women and girls remain among the most severely affected population groups in 2026, with more than 10.7 million in need of humanitarian assistance, including 2.4 million living in areas of highest severity need (inter-sector severity 4 districts).
Restrictions affecting women’s movement, work, education and participation in the humanitarian response continue to translate directly into reduced access to services and assistance, particularly for health, nutrition, protection and needs assessments. Community feedback consistently highlights that limited presence of female aid workers significantly constrains women’s ability to safely access humanitarian services.1 WHH and women-only households are especially exposed, as many lack an eligible mahram or necessary documentation, increasing exclusion risks and unmet needs.
Afghanistan remains one of the most dangerous places in the world to give birth, with an estimated maternal mortality ratio of 638 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2024 – the highest in Asia and seventh highest globally.2 While this reflects progress compared to two decades ago, recent gains are now at serious risk of reversal. Funding cuts, shortages of female health workers, essential medicines and emergency obstetric care are directly contributing to preventable maternal and neonatal deaths, especially in rural areas. The continued ban on medical education will only compound these challenges as the cadre of Afghan women entering the workforce becomes more heavily curtailed.
WHH consistently report higher food insecurity, poorer shelter conditions and greater reliance on emergency-level coping strategies, including early marriage of daughters and child labour.3 Economic restrictions on women’s work and mobility further erode household resilience and deepen dependence on humanitarian assistance.4
GBV risks continue to rise, driven by economic distress, displacement, climate shocks and women’s confinement to the home. Limitations on movement, including restrictions on work, and the requirement for a mahram can trap women and girls in abusive environments while simultaneously restricting safe access to GBV services. The ongoing ban on female secondary education now affects some 2.2 million adolescent girls,5 with long-term implications for protection, mental health, livelihoods and community recovery.6
Women-led organisations (WLOs), critical for reaching women and girls, face persistent administrative and operational barriers, negatively affecting their ability to deliver services. Safeguarding women’s access to assistance and ensuring women’s meaningful participation in the design and delivery of the response remain central to the life-saving objectives of humanitarian action in Afghanistan.
Afghan returnees
Since late 2023, sustained forced and spontaneous returns from Pakistan and Iran have resulted in more than 5 million Afghans returning with limited preparation, assets or social networks. Many arrive following detention, harassment or confiscation of documentation and property, and reach border points in acute vulnerability with immediate needs for food, shelter, health care, protection and livelihoods. Many must move almost immediately onward to destinations to which they are unfamiliar and have few familial ties. In 2026, more than 2.7 million returnees, including 1 million men, and 1.7 million women and children, are anticipated to require urgent humanitarian assistance in their areas of return. Return areas, particularly in the east, south and major urban centres such as Nangarhar, Kandahar and Kabul, face intense pressure on housing, basic services and labour markets. Shelter is consistently ranked among the most critical needs, with many returnees residing in overcrowded, substandard or unaffordable rented accommodation and facing heightened eviction risks.7 Access to civil documentation remains limited, restricting freedom of movement, access to services and tenure security, while increasing protection risks - especially for women and girls.8 Livelihood opportunities are scarce. Many returnees rely on low-paid daily labour and carry significant debt, having borrowed money from family, kin, friends or informal money lenders. Returnees are often unable to utilise vocational skills acquired abroad due to lack of capital, tools or market access.
Protection risks - including child labour, early and forced marriage, exploitation, psychological distress and GBV – remain acute, particularly for women, adolescent girls and unaccompanied or separated children. Upon return, women and girls face distinct challenges arising from restrictive policies, with access to education and employment or livelihoods consistently identified as their top priorities. These restrictions, compounded by lack of documentation and weak support networks, directly limit opportunities and increase vulnerability. According to recent monitoring, 60 per cent of interviewed returnee women reported that they cannot move freely. As a coping mechanism, women and girls increasingly avoid public spaces perceived as unsafe, including markets (51 per cent), education facilities (46 per cent), parks (42 per cent) and social and communal areas (28 per cent), further reducing their access to essential services and humanitarian assistance. Education barriers remain acute, with 58 per cent of interviewed returnee households identifying the ban on girls’ education as a key reason for not sending children to school.9
EO contamination, land disputes and localised insecurity further hamper safe and sustainable reintegration. Humanitarian assistance at border points and in areas of return remains a critical stabilising factor but cannot address longer- erm integration needs. Closer alignment with BHN and durable solutions actors will be essential in 2026 to strengthen basic services, livelihoods, shelter, documentation and social cohesion in high-return areas.
Persons with disabilities
Persons with disabilities remain among the most disproportionately affected groups in Afghanistan, with more than 1.8 million persons with disabilities in need of humanitarian assistance. Long-standing structural inequality, decades of conflict, EO contamination and weak health systems have contributed to high disability prevalence. Recent assessments indicate that around 14 per cent of persons with disabilities live with severe disability, most commonly physical, followed by vision, hearing and mental impairments, with higher prevalence in the western region, central highlands and southeastern areas.10 Explosive remnants of war continue to cause new injuries and long-term impairments each year.
Households headed by persons with disabilities report higher unemployment, deeper indebtedness, worse food security and greater reliance on negative coping strategies than the national average.11 Physical inaccessibility of facilities, prohibitive costs, stigma and limited specialised services reduce access to adequate shelter, safe water, sanitation, healthcare and rehabilitation.
Protection monitoring identifies persons with disabilities among those facing the greatest barriers to accessing basic services, education and livelihood opportunities, due to inaccessible infrastructure, communication challenges and discrimination.12 Furthermore, women and girls with disabilities face heightened risks of neglect, exploitation and GBV, further aggravated by mobility restrictions and dependence on caregivers.13
Rural households
Rural households continue to face acute, multi-dimensional vulnerabilities driven by fragile economic conditions, recurrent drought, limited access to services and environmental shocks. Access to basic services remains a key challenge with 29 per cent of rural households reliant on unimproved water sources, compared with 13 per cent in urban areas, increasing their exposure to water-borne disease and undermining hygiene outcomes.14 Long travel distances and poor infrastructure mean rural families must invest disproportionate time and resources to reach health facilities, markets, water points and schools.
At the same time, rural livelihoods are heavily dependent on rain-fed agriculture and livestock, leaving households highly exposed to climate variability, reduced pasture, rising input costs and market disruptions. Economic disparity is also pronounced, with rural incomes nearly 10 per cent lower than urban incomes and substantially declining since 2023.15 Historical data (2019–20) indicates that three out of four poor households resided in rural areas,16 and more recent evidence suggests these structural poverty patterns persist under current conditions.
Combined, these pressures contribute to high levels of food insecurity, limited livelihood diversification and heavy reliance on informal coping mechanisms and remittances among rural populations. Seasonal isolation due to snow, floods and road closures further disrupts access to food, fuel, healthcare and assistance during critical periods, reinforcing chronic vulnerability.
Community priorities, preferences and capacities
Evidence from collective community feedback mechanisms, including Community Perception Monitoring on the System-Wide Accountability Platform, indicates that crisis-affected people continue to emphasise safety, transparency and flexibility in how assistance is delivered. As of August 2025, three out of four of 4,621 respondents reported that assistance met their basic needs fully or mostly, though persons with disabilities expressed higher dissatisfaction levels (28 per cent) than other groups (22 per cent).17
Community preferences clearly favour flexible assistance modalities. According to these feedback exercises, 38 per cent of respondents preferred a combination of cash and in-kind assistance, and 27 per cent preferred cash alone, reflecting strong demand for assistance that allows households to prioritise food, rent, healthcare, transport and debt repayment.
Smaller proportions prioritised livelihoods support, in-kind assistance only, construction/rehabilitation and service-based assistance. These findings reinforce cash and mixed-modality responses (65 per cent combined) as central to meeting basic needs where markets are functioning.
Food, safe water, healthcare and livelihoods support are consistently ranked as top priorities, reflecting the cumulative effects of economic hardship, climate shocks, displacement and weak public services. Protection concerns, especially personal safety, GBV, child protection and inclusion of persons with disabilities, feature prominently in community feedback.
Perceptions of fairness and transparency remain a concern. One in five respondents reported that they do not understand how humanitarian organisations decide who receives assistance, with slightly higher levels among women (24 per cent) and persons with disabilities (22 per cent). Communities frequently report perceived bias in aid allocation and express strong preferences for direct household-level assessments, clearer eligibility information and more accessible complaints and feedback mechanisms.
Across feedback channels, communities expressed a strong preference for interpersonal, community-embedded communication. Face-to-face engagement with aid workers remains the most trusted source of information (29 per cent), followed by community shuras (20 per cent) and informal networks such as friends, neighbours and relatives (16 per cent).
Community focal points (14 per cent) and mosques (12 per cent) also play important roles in information dissemination, while community meetings account for 10 per cent of preferred sources. These patterns underscore the continued importance of locally rooted, low-connectivity communication strategies to ensure inclusive access to information in high-vulnerability settings.
Most aid recipients report feeling safe when accessing assistance, but a small yet important minority indicate they cannot do so safely (1.3 per cent). Safety concerns are slightly higher among persons with disabilities (1.5 per cent), cross-border returnees (1.8 per cent) and internally displaced persons (IDPs) (1.6 per cent) compared to host community members (1 per cent), indicating persistent protection risks for specific population groups.
Communities consistently call for gender-sensitive and disability-inclusive approaches, including the presence of female staff, private spaces at service points, physically accessible infrastructure and tailored information. Qualitative feedback highlights persistent barriers to safe and dignified access, including cultural restrictions, lack of clarity on where and how to access services, physical accessibility constraints, and requirements for a male companion (mahram).
Despite deepening vulnerabilities and reduced assistance in some areas, communities continue to rely heavily on informal coping mechanisms, including family support, community solidarity and mutual aid networks. The widespread acceptance and effective use of cash assistance demonstrate a strong capacity among households to prioritise and manage resources according to their most urgent needs.
2026 Humanitarian Outlook and Risks
The humanitarian outlook for Afghanistan in 2026 remains shaped by overlapping risks, including climate-related hazards, large-scale population movements, persistent insecurity, regional tensions with Pakistan, public health threats and structural protection challenges. While large-scale armed conflict remains lower than in the pre-2021 period, the likelihood of continued or renewed sporadic clashes with Pakistan, which may or may not be confined to the border, persists. Similarly, climate, mobility and disease-related shocks unfolding within deep socio-economic fragility are expected to drive recurrent humanitarian needs throughout the year, requiring sustained readiness and anticipatory action.
Conflict and insecurity
For 2026, the conflict risk outlook indicates chronic, localized insecurity driven by explosive hazards, low-intensity armed clashes, Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISKP) attacks, and cross-border volatility, creating pockets of heightened protection risks and periodic displacement.
Although territorial expansion by ISKP is not anticipated, the group is expected to retain both the intent and capability to carry out high-impact mass-casualty attacks against civilian, religious and urban targets, with continued risks of localised displacement and service disruption.18
Conflict risks in 2026 are further shaped by regional and cross-border tensions, particularly along the eastern frontier with Pakistan. Escalating hostilities in 2025, including cross-border airstrikes and armed exchanges, resulted in significant civilian casualties particularly in Spin Boldak district in Kandahar province and parts of Helmand, Kunar, Paktika and Paktya provinces triggering localised displacement and compounding humanitarian needs.19 These tensions are closely intertwined with Pakistan’s mass deportation of undocumented Afghans, linking security dynamics directly with large-scale population movements, protection risks and humanitarian caseloads. Periodic, or even prolonged border closures, military incidents and sporadic airstrikes are likely to persist in 2026, adding further volatility to already sensitive border regions. Compounding these challenges, EO contamination remains a chronic constraint on safe movement and land use.
Drought
Afghanistan enters 2026 under heightened drought pressure, marking the sixth successive year of poor rains. According to seasonal outlooks of evolving La Niña conditions, the 2025/26 wet season is expected to bring below-average precipitation and above-average temperatures through early 2026, with soil-moisture deficits already observed across most livelihood zones.20 This points to the continuation of a prolonged, multi-year drought cycle rather than a temporary dry spell, with significant implications for agricultural production, pasture regeneration, water availability and displacement in the first half of 2026.
Food assistance needs at the peak of the lean season (November 2025–March 2026) are projected to be among the highest recorded since monitoring began in 2014, driven by a below-average 2025 harvest, drought-induced livelihood losses and declining income from remittances and agricultural labour. Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to emerge in Faryab, Ghor and Daykundi provinces at the height of the lean season, while Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are projected to persist across much of the northern and western highlands until the May 2026 harvest.21 Forecasted La Niña conditions through early 2026, combined with above-average temperatures, are expected to further constrain winter planting, pasture recovery and spring irrigation.
Moreover, drought-induced water scarcity and deteriorating WASH conditions raise the risk of AWD outbreaks, malnutrition and displacement, especially in rural areas lacking safe water, sanitation or health infrastructure. When combined with other stressors such as economic decline and large-scale returnee inflows, drought may act as a catalyst for multi-sector humanitarian emergencies in the first half of 2026.
Based on the projected drought conditions and La Niña forecast, the 2026 HNRP plans for an anticipated caseload of 10.9 million drought affected people in need across 65 districts in the northern, western and southern regions.
Returnee inflows
Return-related risks remain high and structurally embedded in the regional context throughout 2026. Recent policy announcements in both Iran and Pakistan indicate a significantly heightened risk of large-scale, rapid returns driven by enforcement measures rather than spontaneous movement. On 17 August 2025, the Government of Iran announced its intention to deport up to two million Afghans by March 2026, signalling the potential for sustained, high-volume inflows to Afghanistan over the course of the year.22 In Pakistan, authorities announced on 31 July 2025 that Afghans holding Proof of Registration (PoR) cards would become subject to deportation under the ’Illegal Foreigners Repatriation Plan.23 More than 1.4 million Afghans currently hold PoR cards, many of who have resided in Pakistan for decades, representing a substantial latent caseload at high risk of forced return.24 This risk was further compounded on 25 September 2025, when the Government of Pakistan announced its plans to close 16 Afghan refugee camps affecting more than 90,000 refugees and raising additional concerns around the scale of potential return movements.25
Based on historical trends and current risk projections, the 2026 HNRP anticipates a caseload of 2.8 million additional returnees, primarily through eastern, southeastern and western border corridors, including an estimated 1.6 million from Iran and 1.2 million from Pakistan. The scale, speed and policy-driven nature of potential returns remain one of the most significant systemic risks to humanitarian conditions, with far reaching implications for food security, basic services, livelihoods, and social cohesion.
Natural disasters
Earthquakes and floods will continue to pose significant sudden-onset risks, driven by active fault lines, climate change and environmental degradation.
The country lies across several major tectonic plates and has experienced multiple major earthquakes in recent years, repeatedly exposing the extreme fragility of traditional housing, degraded infrastructure and limited emergency response capacity.
At the same time, recurrent seasonal flooding in addition to flash floods continue to affect river basins in the north, northeast, east and central highlands, driven by erratic rainfall, rapid snowmelt, deforestation and poor land-use planning. These hazards regularly destroy homes, markets, roads, irrigation networks, farmland and water systems, undermining livelihoods, disrupting access to services and triggering repeated displacement. Climate change is intensifying both the frequency and severity of flood events, while population growth, ISET expansion and returnee concentration in hazard-prone areas are increasing exposure.
The 2026 HNRP projects that more than 370,000 natural disaster affected people will be in need of humanitarian assistance.
Implications for the 2026 humanitarian response
The combined analysis of PiN, severity and risk outlook underscores that Afghanistan’s humanitarian needs remain structurally embedded and nationwide, even as refined methodologies yield a lower PiN figure than 2025. The persistence of large caseloads in inter-sector severity 3 and severity 4 districts, the diffusion of severe needs to new areas, and the concentration of risk among specific groups – women and girls, returnees, persons with disabilities and rural households – require a tightly prioritised, protection-centred and risk-informed response.
Without sustained life-saving assistance, effective anticipatory action and inclusive protection approaches, the convergence of climate shocks, mass returns, economic stress and gender-based restrictions will drive further erosion of coping capacity, deepen protection risks and prolong dependency. The 2026 HNRP therefore focuses on stabilising the most vulnerable populations in the highest-severity areas while working in parallel with BHN and longer-term actors to address underlying structural drivers where conditions allow.
Returnees - people on the move
Afghanistan is experiencing one of the largest return-related displacement crises globally. In 2025 alone, more than 2.61 million Afghans returned from Iran and Pakistan, driven by security developments, geopolitical tensions, including between Israel-Iran in June, forced deportations, and deteriorating protection and livelihood conditions in host countries. The scale and geographic concentration of returns is a core driver of inter-sectoral severity in 2026, particularly in eastern border districts, western reception corridors and major urban centres where returnees overlap with drought-affected, food-insecure and service-constrained populations.
Between 1 January and 30 November 2025, more than 805,000 Afghans returned from Pakistan following widespread raids, arbitrary detentions and forced deportations throughout the year. Returns from Pakistan surged in April 2025 following the enforcement deadline for undocumented Afghans, with pressure further escalating in July 2025 after confirmation that PoR cards would not be renewed.
Returns from Iran peaked in early July 2025, driven by regional instability and worsening socio-economic conditions. Between 1 January and 30 November 2025, more than 1.8 million returns originated from Iran, placing disproportionate pressure on western and central return corridors.
This scale of movement has placed extreme pressure on border points, transit facilities and high-return provinces at a time of widespread economic fragility, food insecurity and service overstretch. Humanitarian partners expanded reception capacity at key border crossings, providing medical screening, protection services, food, WASH, registration, legal counselling and transportation. However, needs extend beyond initial reception, particularly in the first 30–60 days after return, when households face acute shelter, food, health, protection and livelihood gaps. The onset of winter conditions in late 2025 will further erode coping capacity among newly returned families. Nearly all returnees arrive without assets, savings or viable shelter options, and many have lost documentation and livelihoods during displacement. Many lack social, cultural or familial ties to their areas of return. Women and girls now comprise approximately 42 per cent of arrivals, heightening risks related to access to education, livelihoods, essential services and protection.26 Highly vulnerable groups are prominent among returnees, including women-headed households, which account for 9 per cent of all undocumented returns from Iran and Pakistan.27
Returnees face some of the lowest income levels recorded across population groups, averaging AFN 6,623 ($101) per month, compared with AFN 8,475 ($130) among host communities.28 In high-return districts, returnee unemployment reaches 80–95 per cent. Debt is now nearly universal, affecting 88 per cent of returnee households, 85 per cent of IDPs and 81 per cent of host communities, who are often indebted to relatives, money lenders or their landlords.29 Financial distress is driving severe trade-offs with over half of returnee households reporting forgoing medical care to afford food, while more than half lack adequate living space or basic bedding. Moreover, rental prices have increased by 100–300 per cent in some return-affected districts.30
Return pressure has been most acute in Balkh, Faryab, Herat, Kabul and Kunduz provinces, where absorption capacity is already overstretched. In August 2025, a rapid, non-exhaustive ISET mapping identified 36 larger ISETs (with a total population of 258,616 people): nine with populations between 10,000 and 40,000 in Daikundi and Nangarhar provinces, and 27 with populations between 1,050 and 5,950 in Baghlan, Balkh, Faryab, Herat, Jawzjan, Kandahar, Khost and Sar-e-Pul provinces.31 These ISETs are hosting returnees from previous waves as well as returnees that arrived in recent months. In addition to the larger sites, there are hundreds of smaller ISETs, many of which are of a temporary nature. A June 2025 UN-Habitat estimate indicated that more than 9 million people are living in ISETs across the country. These locations are facing acute shelter shortages, heightened risk of eviction, and severe strain on health, education and WASH services, alongside overloaded food systems and local markets.32
Health facilities face persistent medicine and staffing shortages, particularly affecting maternal, child and emergency care. Schools in several high-return districts are operating beyond capacity, with some areas reporting that the teacher to student ratio has risen to 1:70 following the enrolment of returnee children, while 1:30 to 1:40 is considered normal according to the Ministry of Education.