Somalia

Intersectoral Protection Analysis Somalia (2023)

Intersectoral Analysis of Protection Risks in Somalia-August 2023

Update on Centrality of Protection in Somalia

Introduction

The Inter-Agency Standing Committee Statement recognizes protection as the purpose and intended outcome of humanitarian action. The centrality of protection means more than protection mainstreaming. It includes ensuring that leadership, coordination, and engagement in protection and all sectors is more strategic, aligned and directed toward a stronger response. While protection of the rights of people is primarily the duty of member states and, in conflict, the parties to a conflict, Humanitarian Coordinators (HCs) and Humanitarian Country Teams (HCTs) are responsible for ensuring that protection is the purpose and intended outcome of humanitarian response. Humanitarian Country Teams and all clusters and sectors must ensure that “protection of all persons affected and at-risk informs humanitarian decision-making and response, including engagement with States and non-State parties to conflict.”

Definition of Centrality of Protection

Centrality of Protection is a collective responsibility and requires that the protection of all persons affected and at risk must inform humanitarian decision making and response. It also emphasizes on the importance of the involvement of all humanitarian actors in protection, irrespective of their sector-specific expertise with the aim of contributing to the reduction of risks.

This is done through.

  • Addressing protection issues that may fall within or intersect with the usual work of the Clusters or Organizations.
  • Working with other Clusters (Intersectoral) to mitigate, reduce, prevent risks, and respond to consequences.
  • Working with and mobilizing actors within and beyond the humanitarian system such as nexus actors e.g., development and peace building actors.
  • Monitoring and Evaluating progress and achievements of collective commitment of putting protection at the center of our humanitarian response.

For the Humanitarian Country Team in Somalia to collectively implement a protection risk-based humanitarian response, strategic planning for Centrality of Protection (CoP) is guided by the Protection Risk Equation as recommended by the IASC CoP Benchmarks.

Infographic Somalia Protection Analysis

Somalia has been in the forefront in driving the centrality of protection agenda through prioritizing system changes in the humanitarian response. Through this analysis, short, medium and long-term actions that reduces the threats, specific vulnerabilities and increase the coping capacities of affected communities, will be identified and implemented through integrated humanitarian response approaches.

The Protection Pyramid Somalia

Operationalizing Centrality of Protection (IASC EDG/P2P)

Somalia’s Path to Centrality of Protection

Through high level advocacy, Somalia identified and recommended risk reduction approaches in addressing 3 prioritized protection risks in Somalia. They include:

  • Risk of exclusion and denial of access to assistance: Through principled, equitable and quality humanitarian assistance, to understand the risk and/or threat of exclusion, identify and address the different types of exclusion that is based on age, gender, ability, ethnicity, or clan affiliation.
  • The Risks associated with displacement: Through identifying threats facing displacement affected communities, address critical protection concerns that persist due to protracted displacement in sites and the lack of appropriate solutions (local integration, return or settlement elsewhere) for the persons displaced.
  • The Risk of indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilians’ assets: Through engaging with conflict affected communities and parties (national and international) to the conflict to minimize the targeting of civilians and civilian assets. Risk reduction driven approaches such as strengthening the community-based protection, provision of assistance and reducing the risks of children and youth associated with armed actors or injuries associated with explosive hazards.

These risks have also been embedded in the:

  • HCT Centrality of Protection Strategy 2022-23
  • Somalia Humanitarian Response Plan 2023 and its System Implementation Plan-June 2023
  • The Somalia ICCG IASC Scale Up Strategic Priorities and Benchmarks 2023
  • The Somalia HCT Accountability Compact 2023

Protection Risks

Protection Risks

Risk 1: Risk of Exclusion and Denial of Assistance

Threats

Restriction and Obstruction to Accessing Aid due to:

  1. Exclusion and lack of access to those most in need -Somalis from poorer, social groups with limited access to power holders - such as the Digil-Mirifle, the Somali Bantu and other minority communities – constitute the bulk of total IDPs in southern Somalia. They are much more likely to cluster in IDP sites in cities such as Baidoa and Dolow, where they are making up a larger and growing percentage of the total urban population.

Specific vulnerable groups identified are households from specific clans and sub-clans that do not have the power to negotiate a share of resources because they are either.

  • Ethnic groups: these include the Somali Bantus, the Arab Somalis, the Bravenese and the Banaadiri. These fall outside the traditional Somali clan framework and are seen to have foreign origin.
  • Occupational groups: Midgaan, Madhibaan, Gaboye, Yahar, Tumaal and Eylo (blacksmiths, leatherworkers, hunters etc.) are scattered throughout the country along with the dominant pastoralist clans. They are not regarded as having a non-Somali or foreign origin. Despite this, they are discriminated because of their traditional occupation and treated as an inferior group.
  • Smaller clans: these can be sub-clans of dominant clans, e.g. Ajuran of the Hawiye, or stand-alone small clans, e.g. Ashraf are often marginalized because of their small numbers or perceived small numbers. Nevertheless, they did not experience the same levels of exclusion as the Somali Bantu and clans defined as occupational groups.

  1. Diversion of Humanitarian Assistance – Equitable distribution of aid is blocked by powerful influencers in key positions (individual gatekeepers at the community, NGO, or State level). The risk of abuse of power is thus derived from a combination of clan affiliation, corruption and/or politics exacerbated by the complex operating context with limited oversight over aid delivery.
  2. Intimidation, Abuse and Exploitation of IDPs by Gate keepers who Govern IDP settlement and treat IDPs as commodities and the settlement as income generating activities. This further exposes the recipient of humanitarian aid vulnerable to sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA).
  3. Violations and lack of legal protection: land-grabbing due to unsolved land disputes or access to natural resources, heightened risk of protection violations including limitations on the freedom of movement and a lack of legal recourse in relation to violations affecting the marginalized and lower status social groups during wider conflict and/or drought related displacement.

Consequences and Specific Vulnerabilities to identified Threats.

  1. Impediments to Identity, residency, and Civil status: Perception by the host community that IDPs living in the camps only possess rights to resources and political rights in their home of origin and not the host city.(Mogadishu, Kismayu and Puntland).
  2. Discrimination: IDP Community made up of separated families with men and youth left behind are perceived to be linked to Non-State Armed groups further limiting them the opportunities to integrate in the host community.
  3. Impediment to durable solutions: By prolonging vulnerability amongst IDPs which diminishes the impact of humanitarian interventions.
  4. Gate Keepers phenomenon: which affects IDPs access to assistance leading to food insecurity and malnutrition and exposing the IDPs to forced evictions.
    1. IDPs not able to pay immediately and agree to hand over cash or food they received from humanitarian organizations or other sources.
    2. Beneficiaries are more concerned for their day-to-day survival than reporting the diversion.
    3. An unwritten agreement between the camp residents and gatekeepers (or camp owners) requires beneficiaries of NGO activities to give an agreed portion to the gatekeeper.
    4. The collection of monies or food by the camp hierarchy might also include rent charged for accommodation, water and other services provided at the camp, such as security.
  5. Limit of Access to Information/awareness regarding available services and assistance: This may be due to the unavailability of the information in their language (Maay, Af Jiidu, etc.)or as a result of disruption of community structures because of displacement, as well as power imbalances and marginalization.
    1. Information is often provided by the potentially abusive gatekeepers who lack accountability to both the displaced populations and formal authorities.
    2. Needs or complaints are expressed through the gatekeepers which compromises community engagement and feedback mechanism.
    3. Direct and indirect obstructions by gatekeepers hampers site-level engagement with affected populations through regular and detailed assessments and protection monitoring.
    4. Lack of awareness that exchange of aid with sex and other resources is exploitation and abuse and should be reported.
  6. Inability to access services limited by their vulnerability and exposure to risks such as child-headed households, the elderly and PWD.

Recommendations to operationalize/contribute to Risk-Reduction Strategy.

On the Restriction and Obstruction to Accessing Aid
  1. Increase engagement with communities and minimize the powers of the middle parties.
  2. Improve communication and transparency on beneficiaries’ entitlement.
  3. Establish a joint mechanism to engage populations and effectively capture the perspective of those receiving assistance (Perception survey).
  4. Ensure better meaningful access to the affected population through.
    1. Humanitarian actors to engage with the relevant State authorities to ensure they play their role in protection of IDPs
    2. Define the roles and responsibilities of Gate Keepers in the project cycle
    3. Training gate keepers on protection mainstreaming and protection principles, PSEA principles as well as on accountability measure put in place to prevent and respond to denial or diversion of aid.
    4. Develop/strengthen and empower IDP committees (Inclusive of marginalized and minority affiliated individuals) to engage in meaningful dialogue with duty bearers and aid agencies and act appropriately and effectively by ensuring inclusion, transparency, and accountability.
    5. Linking Community structures/representatives to the community-based targeting by Clusters Vulnerability based prioritization.
    6. Funding proposals must ensure minority targeting and inclusion. A scoring methodology/inclusion marker to be provided e.g.
      1. Demonstrate awareness of minority inclusion with well-argued analyses of minority/majority relationships, political processes and political exclusion and accountability failures.
      2. Mapping and other minority related analysis
      3. Feedback from minority groups/representative during development of a funding proposal.
      4. Demonstrate how social-political analysis informs targeting: Such as the 4.5 formula, realities of exclusion based on ethnicity and power in Somalia/Somali Land.
      5. DO NO HARM compliance from a minority perspective and adaptation to risk tolerance and other innovative approaches.
      6. Donor reporting template to include actions clusters/agencies have taken to improve minority inclusion, desegregated reporting based on age, gender and diversity (including people with disability, minority or ethnic disadvantage).
    7. Defining vulnerability and targeting criteria together with the communities, with common key messages disseminated prior to registration with clear information about, rights and entitlement of the targeted beneficiary.
    8. Strengthening community-based complaints and feedback mechanism that adheres to the DO NO HARM principle towards receiving SEA cases and reporting using the provided channels, collecting and analyzing data related to exclusion/discrimination and targeting best practices from the affected communities.
    9. Promote integrated protection and conflict sensitive programming with other Clusters by dedicating support for capacity and/or enablers to mitigate instances of aid exclusion or diversion.
    10. There is need to monitor the level of minority exclusion through a perception survey for understanding risks and occurrences of exclusion.
    11. There is need to strengthen the understanding of social fabric dynamic and its impact on discrimination to equitable need-based access to humanitarian assistance e.g. requiring partners to assesse the risk of exclusion for marginalized groups.
    12. Conduct socio-political and risk analysis to determine the suitable measures of mitigating the risk during the planning and design stage of project proposals.
    13. Increase community engagement to improve communication and transparency on beneficiaries entitlements.
    14. There’s need to revitalize/reactivate inclusion working group with representation from cluster focal point to ensure regular information sharing on aid diversion to the ICCG and HCT
Abuse, Exploitations of Minorities
  1. Securing the rights, entitlements and protection to access justice systems that have the capacity and willingness to deliver on the rights of the affected population through:
    1. Identifying barriers to exercise rights, through a tailored mapping of duty bearers and monitoring
    2. Capacity building of Duty Bearers to influence and make them aware of the rights of affected population.
    3. Collaboration with Development actors and Peace operations towards strengthening governance system and duty bearers’ capacity and willingness to implement laws and meet justice needs in accordance with International and National laws.
    4. Linking Community structures/representatives to the community-based targeting developed by Food Security Cluster and other Clusters Vulnerability based prioritization.
    5. Rights information is accessible, relevant, timely, trustworthy, corroborated, and actionable.
  2. Develop comprehensive collective complaints feedback/follow up mechanism that is accountable, protects and safeguards people’s safety and dignity when they report abuse, exploitation and corruption and informs program quality, targeting and adaptive.
  3. Increase community awareness on their rights to free aid and the code of conduct for Aid workers (PSEA Principles) and reporting mechanism.

Risk 2: Risk Associated with Displacement

From an internal displacement perspective, several frameworks and policies have been developed to address the “Risk of Displacement.”

  • FGS National Durable Solutions Strategy (2020-2024)
  • Somalia Social Protection Policy – March 2019
  • FGS Na7onal Reconcilia7on Framework (2019)
  • UN Secretary-General’s High Level Panel Report on Internal Displacement (September 2021)

The Analysis covered the below categories of the IDPs in Somalia:

  1. Newly Internally Displaced Persons-Those displaced within the past 12 months
  2. Protracted IDPs-Those displaced for more than 12 months

Threats

Threats Affecting Newly Internally Displaced

Most of these categories of IDPs settle in existing IDP sites while others choose to settle elsewhere outside the existing sites for example in informal sites in Baidoa, Belet Weyn, Banadir and Hiran.

  1. Safety and security concerns for those living in makeshift shelters that do not provide adequate physical protection; fear of robbery while collecting firewood, accessing markets and at distribution areas.
  2. Lack of civil documentation including national identification document, passport or birth certificate and the cost challenges in obtaining them.
  3. Barriers to accessing services including long distances with service providers, household chores takes precedent, difficult to reach services, lack of information/awareness on services for women and girls.
  4. Violation of human rights and protection due to conflict at their place of origin, during their displacement journey and at their place of being hosted.
  5. Absent State protection systems such as Lack of police posts in or close to settlements, lack of proper lighting on routes to the latrines, water points and firewood collection areas.
  6. Perception to linkage with Non-State Actors: Some IDP communities who are also affected by draught, maybe made up of separated families with men and youth remaining behind. This may expose them to discrimination and limit further their opportunities to integrate in the host communities.
  7. Risk of forced evictions: Majority of newly displaced persons settle on areas privately owned or owned by the gate keepers or in informal settlements.
  8. Family separation exposing children to violence, abuse, neglect, and exploitation.
  9. Psychosocial distress due to loss of livelihoods, properties, shelter, education etc leading to negative coping mechanism such as child marriage, child marriage among others.
  10. Risks of explosive hazards: This affects internally displaced persons moving into areas suspected and/or confirmed to be contaminated with land mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), given a low level of contextual awareness and knowledge exposing them to injuries and sometime, death.
Threats Affecting Protracted IDPs

Majority resides in overcrowded shelters in formal and informal settlements as a result of population growth e.g. in Baidoa, Banadir and Hiraan.

  1. Limited access to basic services as they are settled further from the essential facilities such as schools, health centers, markets.
  2. Absent or weak State protection systems such as limited to no information on available protection and accountability measures, influence of the security by local clan dynamics and historical grievances (e.g. the Somali Bantu in Middle Shabelle), exclusion from political processes at State and federal level, discriminatory and harmful social cultural practices relating to gender, and disenfranchisement of minority clans and other marginalized groups.
  3. Gender Based Violence and sexual exploitation and abuse: Harassment, assault and rape of women and girls by gang members, armed militias and unidentified assailants when collecting firewood in remote camp areas and while accessing latrines in areas with inadequate lighting at night. GBV also occurs while traveling or crossing illegal checkpoints in search of security or assistance. Transactional sex in exchange for resources and services, or passage. Lack of accountability for GBV. High number of cases are those from disadvantaged groups such as the minorities, individuals with specific needs, children and women.
  4. Lack of Civil documentation including the National ID, passport, birth certificate and the cost to access them is reported to be higher. IDPs lack of need and the unavailability of those services in the area.
  5. Barriers to accessing services includes long distance to services and the fear of harassment.
  6. Insecurity of tenure on occupancy of land with the 80% of sites located on private owned land.80% of eviction in 2022 was reported in Mogadishu.
  7. Lack of knowledge/awareness on how to access local social services to navigate the urban areas for those displaced from rural areas.
  8. Labeling of IDPs by Host Communities: Although Aid agencies identify them as IDPs as a way to target assistance, the Host Community however, mark them as guests, not degan, or residents. As IDPs, they are viewed as possessing rights to resource access and political rights in their “home” regional state, not in the host city. There have been calls in Mogadishu, Kismayo, and Puntland, that steps should be taken to require IDPs to “go home.”
  9. Cyclic displacement shocks and threats of secondary displacement such as flooding in Beletweyne.
  10. Lack of awareness of existing explosive hazard risks: Increase use of improvised explosive devices (IED) largely in urban areas and increase prevalence across the outskirts and rural areas where military operations are ongoing pose safety threats especially to non-school going children as they spend more time unsupervised.

Consequences and specific vulnerabilities to identified threats.

  1. Increase pressure and over-stretching the existing services due to increased influx of newly displaced IDPs.
  2. Catastrophic hunger and starvation as a result of acute food insecurity and malnutrition in Baidoa and Banadir. This vulnerability exposes them to negative coping mechanism.
  3. Applying Negative Coping mechanism to manage short-term difficulties e.g. sex in exchange for food and money, borrowing food, sharing meals with neighbors, cutting health and education spending, taking children out of school and begging.
  4. Overcrowding, poor living conditions and limited security provision exposes coupled with discriminatory attitudes and limited clan support and protection, exposes the IDPs to acts of deliberate violence, coercion, exploitation, and deprivation in displacement.
  5. Gate Keepers Phenomenon: which affects IDPs access to assistance leading to food insecurity and malnutrition also exposes the IDPs to threat to their physical security and forced evictions.
  6. Limit of Access to Information/awareness regarding available services and assistance: As a result of disruption of community structures because of displacement, as well as power imbalances and marginalization.
    1. Information is often provided by the potentially abusive gatekeepers who lack accountability to both the displaced populations and formal authorities.
    2. Needs or complaints are expressed through these gatekeepers which compromises community engagement and feedback mechanism.
    3. Direct and indirect obstructions by gatekeepers hampers site-level engagement with affected populations through regular and detailed assessments and protection monitoring.
  7. Limitation to providing durable solutions:
    1. Legal Safety-Violation of Housing, Land and Property rights, lack of security of tenure, Absence of community participation and accountability structures.
    2. Material Safety- Limited livelihood options due to ongoing draught, conflict and general insecurities.
    3. Physical Safety-Social exclusion and marginalization, lack of reconciliation and peacebuilding, violated housing, land and property rights and a lack of security of tenure; absence of community participation and accountability structures; limited livelihood options; social exclusion and marginalization; a lack of reconciliation and peacebuilding.
  8. Limitation of Social Capital: Livelihood strategies of the various groups vary which results to reduced clanbased protection and potentially less support, including financial (notably from remittances), during crises.

Recommendations to operationalize/contribute to Risk-Reduction strategy.

Addressing Negative Coping mechanism
  1. Cash grants and cash and voucher assistance to be mainstreamed in programs to support immediate needs and negate negative coping mechanism.
  2. Need to raise awareness to the community on importance of education for their children development.
  3. Increase behavioral change programming to address negative coping mechanism such as child marriages, school dropouts and sex for assistance.
Addressing Overcrowding, poor living conditions and limited security
  1. Develop linkage with development actors and private sector providing housing to avoid overcrowding as well as provide sustainable solutions to housing needs.
Addressing Gate-keepers phenomenon:
  1. Increase engagement with communities and minimize the powers of the middle parties.
  2. Develop and SOP that defines roles and responsibilities of the Gate Keepers.
  3. Improve communication and transparency on beneficiaries entitlement.
  4. Establish a joint mechanism to engage populations and effectively capture the perspective of those receiving assistance (Perception survey).
  5. Securing the rights, entitlements and protection to access justice systems that have the capacity and willingness to deliver on the rights of the affected population through.
    1. Barriers to access justice are identified, addressed, and monitored.
    2. Build the capacity of Duty bearers to make them aware of the rights of affected population.
    3. System strengthening to ensure duty bearers have the capacity and willingness to implement laws and meet justice needs in accordance with International Law and local custom.
    4. Linking Community structures/representatives to the community-based targeting developed by Food Security Cluster and other Clusters Vulnerability based prioritization.
    5. Rights and protection to exploitation and abuse information is accessible, timely, trustworthy, and actionable.
  6. Develop comprehensive collective complaints feedback/follow up mechanism that is accountable, protects and safeguards people’s safety and dignity.
  7. Increase community awareness on their rights to free aid and the code of conduct for Aid workers (PSEA Principles) and reporting mechanism.
Addressing Forced Evictions
  1. Advocate with local authorities/municipal authorities on putting in place moratoriums against forced evictions e.g., learning from the Baidoa moratorium experience.
  2. Engagement with local authorities and partners on implementation of forced evictions guideline(where there are available) and development or adoption of land laws to support with proper land governance.
  3. Sensitization of displacement affected communities and private landowners about land tenures, HLP etc.
  4. Negotiation with private landowners on extension of land tenure/agreements for displacement affected communities.
Addressing Limitation to Access to Information/Awareness
  1. Strengthen Communication with the Community pathways that ensure equity, transparency, and accountability.
  2. Explore alternative platforms that are used to reach and share information with the minority and marginalized groups in the community.
  3. Establish an integrated referral pathways translated into the local language in the area to facilitate cluster response.
  4. Strengthen community engagement and accountability of aid workers and/or gatekeepers by establishing complaints and feedback mechanisms that are accessible and safe for vulnerable communities to engage or report inappropriate behaviors.
Addressing Limitation to providing durable solutions.
  1. Establish /strengthen inclusive community committees to ensure representation in decision making and interventions respond to specific needs and priorities.
    1. The committee will also establish a network of early warning and response systems for the prioritized hazards.
    2. The committee will also establish remedies to address deprivation in displacement and land disputes.
  2. Strengthen/establish human rights monitoring and accountability mechanisms that aims at raising awareness, building capacities and encourage gatekeepers and justice system to operate in the highest possible standards of behaviors thereby maintaining peace and providing meaningful community justice and security.
  3. Supporting access to justice(formal and informal), legal services and strengthening the rule of law by delivering legal aid to vulnerable and marginalized persons in the target locations.
    1. Identify priority legal needs in each community in line with a people centered approach to justice.
    2. Advocating for and facilitating the deployment of legal officers(lawyers,judges and magistrates).
    3. Legal empowerment training to communities to better know and seek for their rights.
    4. Empowerment of the informal systems to uphold inclusivity ,equity, transparency, and accountability and also the rule of law.
    5. Establishment/strengthening the capacity of the paralegals to provide legal advice and assistance.
    6. Support locations specific justice needs such as acquisition of civil documentations and other remedies concerning land grievances.
    7. Monitor the effectiveness of the justice system through analyzing crimes reported at the police and those solved at the justice system or informal system.
  4. Provision of explosive ordinance education to discourage risk taking practices, encourage safe behaviors and actions to be taken when explosive ordinance items are encountered. Further training of trainers targeting community leaders will ensure the information is cascaded to the new arrivals and existing IDPs.
  5. Provision of explosive hazard clearance support: This is the systematic removal and disposal of explosive hazards, including in previously recorded minefields, battle areas and spot contamination with explosive items. Removal of the hazards frees up land and communal (grazing, agricultural, access routes, water points and other social amenities) resources previously blocked by explosive ordnance, facilitating safe access to these resources and enabling development.

Risk 3: Risk of indiscriminate attack on Civilians and Civilian Objects

Threats

Civilians are directly or indirectly affected by or explicitly targeted with violence during inter/intra-communal conflicts. The use of insurgency tactics by al-Shabaab and counter-terrorism strategies exposes civilians to the risk of harm by all parties to the conflict. The civilians are further exposed to the risk of being targeted by Somalia security forces and Government allied forces (e.g., community defense forces), bilateral forces, and ATMIS due to a suspected affiliation with Al-Shabaab. They are also exposed to retaliatory attacks by Al-Shabaab, predatory behavior from Government aligned to non-State armed e.g. local clan militia.

  1. Contaminated areas with unexploded ordnance which indiscriminately kill and maim civilians including children especially following armed engagements.
  2. Use of inherently indiscriminate Pressure Plate IEDs that hamper the freedom of movement on roads and results in large numbers of civilian casualties.
  3. Civilian deaths or injury and destruction of civilian assets including telecom and water infrastructure by forces acting independently or through a bilateral arrangement that is not transparent.
  4. Risk of injury and death from indiscriminate crossfire during armed engagements in populated areas that put civilians at risk and result in loss of houses and other assets.
  5. Targeted attacks on civilians, their assets including willful destruction of property, abduction and stealing of livestock.
  6. Attacks conducted as reprisals related to individuals or communities being perceived as providing support to the FGS and/or in relation to inter-communal conflicts.
  7. Large-scale military offensives that lead to pre-emptive displacement and/or shifts in power balance that led to civilian harm, potential for reprisal attacks against individuals and communities and encourage land-grabbing.
  8. Military withdrawals cause harm for civilians if random or sudden and carried out without warning or a comprehensive exit-strategy exposing civilians to a myriad of protection risks such as:
    1. Pre-emptive displacement
    2. Potential reprisals against individuals or the community.
    3. Potential exposure of protection risk to IDPs protected by the military.
    4. Tension and violence due to land dispossessions and unresolved land disputes.
    5. Potential Exposure to abandoned explosive ordnance, improperly disposed explosive ordnance or contamination from previous conflicts waged in the vicinity of FOBs or defensive positions.
  9. Territorial control by non-state armed actors including by al-Shabaab, exposes civilians to risks impacting on their rights and survival including:
    1. Impediments to humanitarian access due to general insecurity, illegal checkpoints, and the armed conflict.
    2. Disruption of major aid supply routes limits the reach of assistance delivery and significantly increases operating costs, potentially also through extortion by armed groups.
    3. Challenges to freedom of movement for conflict affected communities, especially men and boys who risk being associated with the armed group and face harassment or arrest.
    4. Family separation results in elevated protection risk exposure for women and children in displacement. In smaller towns women and children arriving from the areas controlled by the armed non-state actors face discrimination because of their areas of origin and suffer consequent loss of access to assistance and protection.
    5. Illegal taxation by state actors and improper zakat collections by non-state actors in the form of confiscation of camels and other livestock, harvest, or cash and through forced child recruitment hampers the coping capacity and resilience of affected populations, further increasing humanitarian needs and raising serious protection concerns.
    6. Child recruitment into armed groups: Military operations increase the risk of recruitment and use of children as well as the capture of children formerly associated with the armed group of the opposing party.
    7. Conflict related sexual violence: targeting women and girls as weapons of war by parties to the conflict.
    8. Destruction of Civilian Property such as schools and hospitals and indiscriminate killing of civilians.

Consequences and specific vulnerabilities to identified threats.

Large-scale military offensives
  1. Pre-emptive displacement and shifts in political power that will lead to reprisal attacks on individuals and communities and encourages land-grabbing.
  2. In accessibility of humanitarian aid into the affected population until the location is assessed and cleared off explosive remnants of war.
  3. Injury and death of civilians and civilian objects when attacks happen in close proximity to locations hosting affected population and infrastructures such as schools and hospitals.
ATMIS drawdown and exit
  1. Increase of the Inter and/or Intra-Clan tensions and violence in the region as pre-existing grievances over land ownership and natural resources (e.g., between the Abgaal subclans in Middle Shabelle).
  2. Security vacuum with rearmament of clans "Community Defense Forces" and the limited role of state authorities.
  3. Increase in displaced population because of clashes between militia and tensions over land ownership.
  4. Eruption of pre-existing landownership issues in the newly recovered areas which will lead to violence eruption.
  5. Reprisal attacks to community and individuals for allegedly supporting Somalia security forces, Government Forces e.g., Clan militia where relevant or ATMIS.

Recommendations to operationalize/contribute to Risk-Reduction strategy.

Large-scale military offensive
Parties to the Conflict
  1. HCT/HC to advocate with the Federal Government of Somalia targeting the Somali authorities, Somalia security forces, ATMIS and International Security Forces (e.g., US, Turkey, UAE etc.) on the adherence to the principle of distinction by taking precautions to avoid causing direct or collateral damage to civilian sites and infrastructure.
    1. Continuous engagement with Somali authorities, Somalia security forces, ATMIS and International Security Forces in dialogue through CIMCOORD on locations already cleared for reinteintegration/settlement.
  2. HCT/HC to advocate for the adherence of the SNA Command Order 2017 and SOP 2014 for the reception and handing over of children separated from armed groups.
  3. Training of Somalia security forces on International Humanitarian Law and Protection of Civilians.
  4. Establish an effective early warning alert and response system that highlights survival needs of affected people in the first 4-6 weeks and clusters roles and responsibilities in the prepositioning and response.
  5. Stabilization interventions such as peace building with the local communities to begin in cleared areas from Al-Shabaab control and incursion.
Conflict Affected Communities
  1. Establish functional community structures (community workers, community committees, incentive) that delivers assistance with NGOs and UN present or not present in the locations identified as potential target for military offensive.
    1. Initiate community mapping, context and stakeholder analysis to identify leaders, informal community structure, key stakeholders and gatekeepers on ways to work with them.
    2. Define roles and responsibilities and build their capacities on protection principles and protection mainstreaming.
    3. Define compensation/incentives and the exit strategy of our support.
  2. Raise awareness of the risk associated with explosive hazards and explosive remnants of war to prevent harm to the communities.
Military Drawdown and Exit
  1. HCT/HC to engage with the FGS and ATMIS on discussions and joint assessment framing the ATMIS drawdown that is informed by protection analysis.
  2. HCT to engage in consultations and provide inputs to the UN Security Council Resolutions and the ATMIS communiques on the implications and recommend delays or non-exit of Forward Operation Base currently under ATMIS.
  3. Support communities and State actors to provide rights protective and non-violent dispute resolution to address intra-clan tensions, land ownership in the newly recovered areas and access to water and grazing areas among the pastoralists.
  4. Strengthen community mechanism to transform conflict by
    1. Facilitating dialogue with and between clans and address conflict triggers.
    2. Focus on activities that promote social cohesion e.g., Community mediation to address reprisals.
  1. Annex 1: Somalia HCT Centrality of Protection Strategy Action Plan January 2024-April 2025 (HCT Endorsed on the 12th of December 2023)
  2. Annex 2: Collective Action: Detailed CoP Strategy Implementation Plan January 2024-April 2025(ICCG Endorsed on 3rd of December 2023)

References

  1. The Centrality of Protection In Humanitarian Action: A Review Of Field And Global Clusters In 2016
  2. IASC Policy on Protection in Humanitarian Action 2016
  3. HCT Centrality of Protection Strategy 2022-23
  4. "Internally Displaced People – Layers of Marginalization"-Protection Cluster-OHCHR Joint Note February 2023
  5. Minority Inclusion Learning Review of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland
  6. Protection Cluster-Position Paper: March 2021: Defining a Common Definition of Vulnerability: Marginalized and Minority Groups
  7. FGS - Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconcilia:on: March 7, 2019: Na:onal Reconcilia:on Framework: True Reconcilia:on: Repairing our broken Haan” Let’s repair our broken Haan, together.”